Military Operational Planning and Strategic Moves / by Lucía Martínez Ordóñez.
2017
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Title
Military Operational Planning and Strategic Moves / by Lucía Martínez Ordóñez.
Added Corporate Author
Edition
1st ed. 2017.
Imprint
Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2017.
Description
XIII, 101 p. 21 illus., 6 illus. in color. online resource.
Series
Contributions to economics. 1431-1933
Formatted Contents Note
Introduction
Game Theory and the Decision-Making Process in Military Affairs
Strategies and Tactics
Conflicts as Zero-Sum Games
The Advantage of Moving First Versus a First-Mover Advantage
Irregular Warfare
Modelling Specific Aspects of COIN Operations: On the Possiblity of a First Mover Advantage
The War Against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves
Lessons Learned.
Game Theory and the Decision-Making Process in Military Affairs
Strategies and Tactics
Conflicts as Zero-Sum Games
The Advantage of Moving First Versus a First-Mover Advantage
Irregular Warfare
Modelling Specific Aspects of COIN Operations: On the Possiblity of a First Mover Advantage
The War Against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves
Lessons Learned.
Summary
This book employs game theory to warfare and in particular to military operations. It aims at scrutinizing the validity of the two ideas that have governed the literature on war and warfighting: One is the Clausewitzian Fog of War, which suggests that he who is able to "see" through the gunsmoke and observe his opponent's moves before he has to commit to some strategy himself, should be able to gain an advantage over that enemy; the other is the tradition of understanding military conflict as a zero-sum game. Combined, these ideas seem to imply that war always gives rise to a second-mover advantage. This book questions the validity of this presumption at the operational level of military planning. It provides a simple but rigorous game-theoretic framework in order to analyse operational alternatives for a whole range of typical conflicts Western military forces are facing, including the most recent ones such as Anti-Access/Area-Denial and supporting host nations' counterinsurgency campaigns.
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www
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SpringerLink electronic monographs.
Language
English
ISBN
9783319561080
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