International Antitrust and the WTO:

The Lesson from Intellectual Property

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ABSTRACT

International antitrust issues have become important in current debates regarding international trade and international regulation. This article addresses one of the central questions about international antitrust: the appropriate forum for negotiations. The article argues that a substantive multilateral agreement on antitrust policy is unlikely unless it involves transfers from states that will benefit to those that will lose. The article advocates bringing international antitrust issues within the World Trade Organization (WTO) because that institution presents the best forum for such transfers. Past efforts to negotiate intellectual property (IP) agreements demonstrate the advantages offered by the WTO. As with antitrust, the realities of IP made agreements without

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transfers virtually impossible. Developing countries in particular had little to gain from such agreements. Once parties brought negotiations within the WTO, however, they reached an agreement because developing countries gained trade concessions in exchange for accepting the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement. Like international IP, international antitrust requires a forum that allows for transfers. Again, the WTO provides the best forum.

INTRODUCTION

Antitrust law and policy have outgrown their purely domestic focus to become major international legal issues. This development is evident in both policy circles¹ and academic debates.² The increased importance of international trade and the dramatic fall in international tariffs over the last fifty years explain the growing interest in international antitrust. The success of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO has shifted the focus of trade discussions to non-tariff barriers, which have become a more significant impediment to world trade as tariffs have fallen. Antitrust, the focus of this article, represents one of these important trade-related topics.

Although there is widespread consensus regarding the importance of

1. Competition policy was included on the agenda for the Doha Round of trade talks. See WTO Ministerial Declaration on Trade Negotiations, ¶¶ 23-25, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration of Nov. 14, 2001]. For a discussion of the Doha Meeting, see Eleanor M. Fox, *International Antitrust and the Doha Dome*, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 911 (2003); Robert D. Anderson & Peter Holmes, *Competition Policy and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System*, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 531 (2002).

2. In academic circles, for example, international antitrust has generated a flurry of articles in recent years. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, *International Antitrust: Cosmopolitan Principles for an Open World*, 1998 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 271 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1999); Eleanor M. Fox, *Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways*, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, *Races Up, Down, and Sideways*]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, *International Competition Rules for the GATT-WTO World Trade and Legal System*, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 35 (1993); Andrew T. Guzman, *Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism*, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142 (2001); Andrew T. Guzman, *Is International Antitrust Possible?*, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998) [hereinafter Guzman, *Is International Antitrust Possible?*]; Daniel K. Tarullo, *Competition Policy for Global Markets*, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 445 (1999); Russell J. Weintraub, *Globalization's Effect on Antitrust Law*, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 27 (1999); Diane P. Wood, *Is Cooperation Possible?*, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 103 (1999); Spencer Weber Waller, *An International Common Law of Antitrust*, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 163 (1999); Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasingha, *Moving the Trade and Competition Debate Forward*, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 481 (2001); Bernard Hoekman & Peter Holmes, *Competition Policy, Developing Countries and the WTO*, 22 WORLD ECON. 875 (1999); A. Douglas Melamed, *International Antitrust in an Age of International Deregulation*, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 437 (1998); Salil K. Mehra, *Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International Consensus*, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 191 (1999); Diane P. Wood, *International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the Hare?*, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391 (2002).

international antitrust and the need for discussion at the international level, there is no consensus on how to establish a more successful international regime. Even the proper forum in which to discuss antitrust regulation is the subject of controversy. European Union officials, along with representatives from Canada, Korea, and Japan, have supported negotiations within the WTO. American officials have argued instead for increased bilateral cooperation among administrative agencies.³ There is similar disagreement among academics.⁴ At stake in this debate is much more than a mundane detail of location. As demonstrated in this article, the forum in which international antitrust is discussed is likely to determine whether a substantive international agreement is possible. If parties hold negotiations within the WTO, an international agreement may be possible. If parties hold negotiations in a stand-alone forum, an agreement is highly unlikely.⁵

Because parties have achieved a certain measure of cooperation in the area of international IP (in the form of the TRIPS agreement), this area offers a case study from which one can draw lessons for international antitrust. In fact, the lessons from IP are especially powerful because IP and antitrust have very similar strategic implications for countries' domestic laws and negotiating positions. In addition, negotiations over IP took place in both a stand-alone forum and within the GATT/WTO system.

For many years, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a group that deals exclusively with IP issues, served as the forum for international IP negotiation. And for many years, WIPO failed to produce a substantial international agreement on IP.⁶ During

3. See Tarullo, *supra* note 2 at 445; Fox, *Races Up, Down, and Sideways*, *supra* note 2; Steve Charnovitz, *Triangulating the World Trade Organization*, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 28, 29 (2002); Eleanor M. Fox, *Global Markets, National Law, and the Regulation of Business: A View from the Top*, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 383 (2001); Daniel K. Tarullo, *Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy*, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478 (2000) [hereinafter Tarullo, *Norms and Institutions*]; Eleanor M. Fox, *Competition Law and the Millennium Round*, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 665 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, *Millennium Round*].

4. This article advocates negotiation of antitrust within the WTO. Professors Eleanor Fox and Daniel Tarullo, for example, argue against the inclusion of antitrust within the WTO. See part III, *infra*.

5. The current round of WTO negotiations, the Doha Round, has included competition policy to at least a minimal extent. See Ministerial Declaration of Nov. 14, 2001, *supra* note 1 at ¶¶ 23-25.

6. There have been significant agreements dealing with international IP prior to TRIPS, of course. The two most prominent are the Paris Convention of 1883, see *infra* note 32, and the Berne Convention of 1886, see *infra* note 34. Nor has WIPO been a complete failure. It has produced agreements such as the 1989 Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated

the Uruguay Round, IP was included among the topics to be discussed. A few years later, negotiators achieved consensus on the TRIPS agreement, and the world had a substantive agreement covering international IP. The failure of WIPO and success of TRIPS offers a warning against efforts to negotiate an international antitrust agreement outside of the WTO framework, and a demonstration of the potential benefits of inclusion within the WTO. This article presents the lessons of the IP experience for international antitrust.

I. THE EFFECT OF TRADE ON ANTITRUST POLICY

The goal of achieving an international antitrust regime is an ambitious one that presents several significant obstacles. These include, but are not limited to, the following three challenges. First, negotiators must overcome the lack of agreement regarding the optimal content of antitrust policy, even in a closed economy. Some countries view antitrust policy as a tool to pursue economic efficiency and little else. Others seek to protect small or medium sized business. Still others believe that it should be used to protect employment.⁷ Second, achieving compliance with an agreement will be challenging because the enforcement practices of countries are difficult to monitor, and it is even more difficult to compel a country to change them. Finally, consensus on the substantive content of an agreement is difficult to achieve because systematic trade imbalances in imperfectly competitive markets can affect the substantive laws adopted by a country. This moves it away from the rules it believes to be optimal for a closed economy, and may also move it away from what other countries are willing to accept.

Although these are daunting challenges, negotiators can take some solace from the fact that prior to the Uruguay Round of trade talks, IP presented precisely the same obstacles, yet an agreement was reached. One of the lessons that the IP experience teaches is that the choice of negotiating forum has a large impact on the likelihood of success. This

Circuits, but none that approaches the scope and importance of TRIPs.

7. See W.S. COMANOR ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONS (1990); Eleanor M. Fox, *The End of Antitrust Isolationism: The Vision of One World*, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 221, 226-27 (1992); Joseph P. Griffin, *EC/U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact on Transnational Business*, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1051, 1052 (1993); Nina Hachigian, *Essential Mutual Assistance in International Antitrust Enforcement*, 29 INT'L LAW. 117, 123-25 (1995); Diane P. Wood, *The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust*, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 304-05; Kevin C. Kennedy, *Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at the World Trade Organization*, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 585, 591-92, 607-8, 650 n.20 (2001).

is especially true with respect to the third item on the above list: the strategic implications of imbalanced trade in imperfectly competitive markets. To understand the regulation of either international intellectual property or international antitrust, it is necessary to consider the strategic position of the countries involved, and how trade is likely to affect the substantive rules adopted by domestic governments.

Before considering the international context, however, it is helpful to be clear about how domestic policies are formed. There are at least two distinct approaches to modeling domestic policy issues. The first, and more conventional, is to assume that political leaders seek to maximize the total welfare of their state, and that they weigh the welfare of each individual equally.⁸ The alternative strategy is to assume that policy makers pursue private goals that diverge from the maximization of national welfare.⁹ For the purposes of this article, however, it is not necessary to choose between these approaches. Rather, this article takes as given what it terms the “closed economy policy” of a state. This is the policy that the state would adopt in the absence of any international trade. Under a public choice model, the interplay of interest groups

8. This is the typical strategy adopted by commentators in both international and domestic law, including in the context of regulatory issues. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, *Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation*, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Merritt B. Fox, *Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom*, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997); Merritt B. Fox, *Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment*, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Roberta Romano, *Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation*, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Jay L. Westbrook, *Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum*, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991); Jay L. Westbrook, *Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies*, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499 (1991); Robert K. Rasmussen, *A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies*, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997); BRAINERD CURRIE, *SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS* 183 (1963).

9. Under this public choice view, regulators are modeled as individuals pursuing their own objectives rather than as faithful agents of their constituencies, and are viewed through the same lens as other economic actors. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, *Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis*, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169 (Special Issue 1990) (“[Public choice] analysts postulate that people should be expected to act no less rationally or self-interestedly as politicians or bureaucrats than they do in the course of their private exchanges in markets.”); George J. Stigler, *The Theory of Economic Regulation*, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, *LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION* 17 (1991). See also Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, *Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System*, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 27 (1996); Alan O. Sykes, *Protectionism as a “Safeguard”*: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991); Steven P. Croley, *Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process*, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41-56 (1998) (providing a thoughtful critique of public choice theory).

generates the preferred policy. Under the public interest model, attempts to maximize domestic welfare generate the policy. By taking the closed economy policy as given, this article focuses on the impact of internationalization on policy and on the prospects for international cooperation.

The analysis of international antitrust and IP assumes that governments and regulators favor their own constituents over foreigners in the sense that they seek to promote the welfare of local residents, even at the expense of foreigners. This assumption is quite standard. It is acceptable whether one views government as acting in the public interest, in which case government seeks to maximize some measure of social welfare, or one believes that government responds to well-organized and well-funded local constituents, in which case it is primarily these constituents whose interests will prevail.¹⁰ To keep the analysis simple, it is assumed that government does not care at all about foreigners; it only cares about local residents. This assumption is stronger than merely assuming that governments care more about locals than foreigners, and is made only for convenience. It does not affect the results of the analysis.

The assumption that governments favor their own constituents is equivalent to an assumption that governments seek to externalize the costs of their policies. For example, in adopting a pollution policy, a government is not concerned with any harm imposed on foreigners. If forty percent of the harm from locally produced pollution extends outside the country, government policy will only take into account the sixty percent that affects locals. Similarly, government will ignore the benefits foreigners enjoy. If, for example, an environmental policy provides benefits to both local residents and foreigners in nearby countries, the government, in evaluating the policy, will consider only those benefits its own constituents enjoy.

A bias in favor of locals affects policy in at least two ways. First, it provides an incentive to create exceptions to local laws when the harm

10. There can, of course, be exceptions to the policy of favoring locals over foreigners. It is imaginable, for example, that foreign-funded lobbies could influence policy. The large amount of money spent by foreign interests in an attempt to lobby the American government attests to this potential. In virtually every important policy context, however, domestic concerns and domestic interest groups have a substantial advantage over foreign interests, and the assumption that policy makers favor locals is reasonable. See Alan O. Sykes, *Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for International Competition Policy*, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 92 (1999):

[F]rom a positive perspective, it is exceptionally unlikely that the welfare of foreign citizens will be weighted equally with the welfare of domestic citizens in the domestic political process. Foreign citizens do not vote in domestic elections, they cannot be taxed, they generally do not donate money to foreign politicians, and so on.

from particular conduct is only (or overwhelmingly) felt abroad. Thus, government will permit domestic parties to engage in activities that benefit them but that harm foreign parties, even when the same government would prevent such activities if they were wholly domestic. Antitrust laws provide a dramatic example of such a policy. In the United States, for example, the Webb-Pomerene Act,¹¹ the Export Trading Company Act of 1982,¹² and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982¹³ provide an antitrust exemption for export cartels. Under these acts, even actions that are in clear violation of American antitrust laws are permissible if they are carried out by firms meeting the statutory definition of engaging exclusively in export activity. The exemption exists because only foreign persons feel the harm of those actions. In economic terms, local exporting firms are permitted to extract whatever monopoly rents they can because foreigners bear the dead-weight loss associated with monopolistic conduct.

The incentive to discriminate against foreigners can also lead to a policy of selective prosecution. Most countries, with the United States being the most prominent exception, make government agencies the exclusive enforcement authority for antitrust laws. Such agencies can use their prosecutorial discretion to target foreign firms and activities more aggressively than local firms and activities.¹⁴

Favoring locals also produces a second, subtler, form of bias that affects the substantive laws of a country. To illustrate this second bias, assume for the moment that every industry in a country satisfies the definition of an export cartel, meaning that it does not sell any of its products locally. Under these conditions, there is no reason for the local government to adopt any form of competition policy. If every producer is an export cartel, it makes sense to “exempt” all producers, just as it

11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1994).

12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1994).

13. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994). For a more detailed discussion of this exemption in the United States, see John F. McDermid, *The Antitrust Commission and the Webb-Pomerene Act: A Critical Assessment*, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (1980). See also *United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n*, 393 U.S. 199 (1968); FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: TEN YEARS LATER 15 (1978).

14. For example, the proposed GE/Honeywell merger was challenged by European competition authorities, an act that many argue was influenced by the fact that both firms are American. See Stefan Schmitz, *How Dare They? European Merger Control and the European Commission’s Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell Merger*, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 325, 325-28 (2002); Edward T. Swaine, *The Local Law of Global Antitrust*, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 630-31 (2001).

makes sense for the United States to exempt its export cartels under the Webb-Pomerene Act. An exemption for every firm, of course, is equivalent to simply having no competition law at all.¹⁵

Now relax the assumption that all locally produced goods are exported and assume instead that a small fraction of local goods (say five percent) are sold domestically and the rest are exported. The optimal policy from the perspective of the local government is to provide an exemption for all exports, while subjecting local sales to whatever antitrust laws are deemed appropriate for domestic activity. If possible, therefore, the government will adopt a Webb-Pomerene type exemption. If the firms that sell locally are the same as those that export, however, it is impossible to adopt this sort of exemption because the antitrust laws apply to the activities of the firm, not individual goods. For example, if a firm wishes to merge with a competitor, it is generally not possible to block that merger with respect to local production while permitting it with respect to foreign production. Thus, if every firm sells five percent of its production locally, there is no way to adopt a Webb-Pomerene style exemption that would affect only exports.

An inability to enact a Webb-Pomerene type exemption, however, does not mean that the country is without recourse. Assuming that this sort of exemption is unavailable, consider the policies that a country might adopt in its effort to provide the maximum possible benefit to its own firms.¹⁶ One option is simply to adopt the same competition policy that the country would adopt in the absence of international trade (the "closed economy policy"). This closed economy policy, however, would protect not only local consumers, who represent five percent of sales, but also foreign consumers who are responsible for ninety-five percent of worldwide sales by local firms. In other words, large numbers of foreign consumers are being protected through regulation that imposes costs on local exporting firms.

15. Strictly speaking, a country may wish to exempt every firm and still have a competition law because that law could be applied against foreign firms whose products are being imported. To make the above discussion completely accurate we must, therefore, assume that the country does not import any goods in imperfectly competitive markets. For a consideration of the impact of imports on country behavior below, see text accompanying note 19.

16. I assume here that a country cannot explicitly favor local firms in their substantive law. If they could do so, of course, a country's optimal strategy would be to adopt stricter rules for foreign firms than for local firms. It may well be that the United States, through its enforcement practices, is engaged in just this sort of discrimination against foreign activity. In the last few years, for example, almost all of the fines levied in criminal enforcement actions have been against international cartels. See 1999 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. ANN. REP., 2-3, 7, 21 (stating that the Department of Justice has adopted a strategy of concentrating its criminal prosecution resources on international activity).

Instead of adopting its closed economy policy, the country could choose to have no competition policy, mimicking the policy it would adopt if all domestic production were exported. This policy, however, fails to protect local consumers and leads to a deadweight loss that is, in part, borne by those local consumers. As the share of local production that is consumed locally increases, so does the share of the total loss from anti-competitive conduct that locals assume.

In fact, the best policy from the perspective of a government that cares only about its own residents is a middle ground between the two above options. Assuming that the government cares about both local consumers and local producers, it should adopt a competition policy that, though extremely lenient compared to its closed economy policy, nevertheless prevents certain conduct.¹⁷ A lenient policy allows local firms to extract significant rents from consumers, most of whom are abroad. Although local consumers will bear some of the loss, the bulk of it goes to foreigners. If the loss is sufficiently large, however, the government prefers to regulate in order to protect its own consumers. It is for precisely this situation that the government wants a policy that restricts firm behavior, even if it only does so in extreme cases. Through a lenient antitrust policy, the government can permit activities up to the point at which the actions of local firms impose such large total losses that the five percent of those losses felt by local residents outweighs the benefits enjoyed by firms. In other words, governments regulate extreme anti-competitive behavior that leads to large global deadweight losses, but do not regulate less extreme actions.¹⁸

As the percentage of production sold domestically increases, locals feel a larger share of the global deadweight loss from the monopolistic activity of local firms. If all production is sold locally, the best policy is simply the closed economy policy. If any production is exported, however, foreign parties experience some of the loss from anti-competitive conduct, and the government has a reduced incentive to regulate. As long as there is international trade, therefore, the export of local production gives the government an incentive to adopt a policy that is weaker than the closed economy policy.

17. If the government cares only about local producers, of course, it should not adopt a competition policy, even in the absence of international trade.

18. For example, if the government weighs the interests of local consumers and local producers equally, it will allow monopolistic activity as long as the additional profits enjoyed by local firms exceed the loss felt by local consumers. If, despite the fact that local consumers feel only five percent of the global loss, that loss exceeds the gain to local firms, the transaction will be regulated.

Up to this point the discussion has considered only exports. The presence of imports has an analogous effect on government policy and can be analyzed in the same way as exports. Suppose that all locally consumed goods are imported. In this environment, the government's preferred policy is stricter than the closed economy policy.¹⁹ This is because in a closed economy, the government takes into account both the profits firms gain when they behave monopolistically and the losses consumers feel as a result of the monopolistic conduct. In a country that has no producers of its own, however, the gains to firms are excluded from the calculus. In fact, in the absence of local firms, the country's best policy is simply to prevent any activity that reduces the well being of local consumers. This is far from the closed economy policy that might permit activities that reduce consumer well-being if producers become sufficiently better off.

If instead of assuming that all consumption is imported, one assumes that a small fraction is produced locally (say five percent) then the local government takes that five percent of profits into account in formulating its preferred policy. The result is a policy that is slightly less strict than is the case if one hundred percent of consumption is imported. This is because the government takes into account a small fraction of producer's profits. The government's preferred policy will approve an activity that imposes a small net loss on consumers if the benefit to producers is so large that the benefit enjoyed by local producers (who only produce five percent of local consumption) exceeds the loss to consumers. The government would prevent this same transaction if all production were imported. As the share of consumption produced locally increases, the preferred government policy becomes less strict. Notice that it is only when zero percent of consumption is imported (meaning all local consumption is produced locally) that the optimal policy is the closed economy policy. Thus, the presence of imports always leads the country toward a stricter competition policy than it would adopt if it were a closed economy.

Combining the above discussion of imports and exports demonstrates how international trade affects the substantive policies of a country.²⁰ In particular, we can predict how a country's policy will change relative to

19. We assume here that the country is able to regulate the activities of foreign firms. If it cannot do so, the country will only consider its own firms when regulating and, as the discussion of exports shows, it will adopt a policy that is weaker than its closed economy policy.

20. For simplicity it is assumed that all gains and losses are distributed proportionally around the world. Thus, for example, if a country has forty percent of the world's firms, those firms enjoy forty percent of global profits; and if a country has twenty percent of the world's consumers, those consumers bear twenty percent of any global loss to consumers. This assumption is not necessary but makes the presentation clearer.

its closed economy policy.²¹ Notice first that if a country's share of global production is the same as its share of global consumption, then the country's optimal strategy is its closed economy policy.²² For example, if the country is responsible for fifteen percent of worldwide production and consumes fifteen percent of that global production, it will adopt the closed economy policy.²³ This is because the country takes into account only fifteen percent of the impact of firm behavior on consumers, creating pressure toward less regulation relative to the closed economy policy. On the production side, the country takes into account only fifteen percent of profits earned by firms producing for local consumption, creating pressure toward greater regulation relative to the closed economy policy. These forces offset one another, leaving the country with its closed economy policy.²⁴

As the share of global production increases relative to the share of global consumption, the optimal domestic policy grows weaker relative to the closed economy policy. Thus, for example, if the country accounts for forty-five percent of world production, but only twenty percent of world consumption, the optimal domestic policy is weaker than the closed economy policy. And if the country produces twenty percent of world production, but accounts for forty-five percent of consumption, the optimal domestic policy is stricter than the closed economy policy. The flow of international trade, therefore, affects the substantive antitrust policy adopted by a country. Countries that are net importers of goods whose markets are imperfectly competitive will adopt antitrust laws that are more stringent, all else being equal, than countries that are net exporters of such goods.²⁵

21. If we assume that governments pursue the well-being of their citizens, deviations from the closed economy policy represent efforts on the part of governments to impose costs on foreigners even if it is believed that those costs exceed the benefits felt domestically.

22. Recall that references to imports and exports are actually references to trade in imperfectly competitive markets, where antitrust policy is relevant. The above result assumes for simplicity that every country consumes the same proportion of the production of every other country. Thus, if a country consumes fifty percent of worldwide production, it consumes fifty percent of the production from each country. This is obviously an unrealistic assumption, but it is helpful to illustrate how a country's preferred policy is affected by trade.

23. This assumes that the country can apply its laws extraterritorially.

24. The assumption is that import and export industries are equally competitive. If this is not so, it is necessary to adjust the above result. The intuition, however, remains the same.

25. The competition policy adopted by countries also differs for reasons other than those presented. For example, there is no consensus among countries regarding the goals of antitrust policy. In the United States, efficiency and the preservation of competition is the primary goal, while in Canada the goal of protecting small and medium sized businesses is also present. See Guzman, *Is International Antitrust Possible?*, *supra* note 2, at 1538-41; Fox, *supra* note 7, at 223;

This article must address one more issue to complete the analysis of national incentives. Although not explicitly stated, the above discussion assumes that countries are able to regulate conduct that takes place abroad but that has a domestic impact. That is, they are able to regulate extraterritorially. If countries are unable (or unwilling) to regulate extraterritorially, their incentives are affected. In particular, they have little incentive to adopt strict regulations in response to a high level of imports. In the absence of extraterritorial laws, a country cannot affect the behavior of foreign firms and strict rules fail to protect local consumers from foreign conduct. In this situation, only local firms are affected by local regulation and the analysis of how trade affects the substantive rules is very much like the case in which there are exports but no imports, implying that the laws tend to be weaker than the closed economy policy.

The above analysis has important implications for the prospect of a negotiated solution to the problems of international competition policy. It suggests that net importers and net exporters will have difficulty reaching an agreement on international antitrust. To see why this is the case, imagine two countries with the same closed economy policy.²⁶ Assume that one country is a net exporter and the other is a net importer of goods produced in imperfectly competitive markets. Because neither country is compelled to accept a negotiated solution, an agreement requires the consent of both.

Consider each country's preferred form of international antitrust. The net importer wants a policy that is stricter than its closed economy policy because the country fails to take into account the profits of foreign firms whose product is sold locally. Among the activities that the country would like to prevent are those that reduce the overall well-being of locals (producers and consumers), even when those activities cause an increase in the profits of foreign firms that more than offsets the net loss to locals. Thus, the net importer wants to block some activities that yield an overall increase in well-being.²⁷ If the country can regulate the activities of foreign firms, it can simply adopt the strict

Griffin, *supra* note 7, at 1051; Wood, *supra* note 7, at 304.

26. Assuming the same closed economy policy makes the analysis simpler. If this assumption is relaxed, it is even less likely that an agreement can be reached because differences in closed economy policies represent an additional potential source of disagreement.

27. If the government does not weigh the interests of consumers and producers equally—say, by favoring producer interests over consumer interests—it remains true that the importer will adopt a stricter rule than it would if all activity were domestic. The impact of the change on efficiency, however, can only be identified if one makes additional assumptions about how the government weighs consumer and producer interests. See Guzman, *Is International Antitrust Possible?*, *supra* note 2.

rule that it prefers.

The net exporter, on the other hand, wants a policy that is weaker than its closed economy policy because it does not take into account the loss to foreign consumers as a result of monopolistic practices. Among the activities that the net exporter would like to permit are activities that yield increased profits to local firms, but that reduce the welfare of foreign consumers by more than the gains to local firms. The net exporter, therefore, wants to allow some activities that lead to an overall loss of welfare.

The two countries, therefore, favor very different international policies, making an agreement on international antitrust difficult. If both countries regulate extraterritorially, the net importer's law, which is stricter than its closed economy policy, will be the relevant rule. As it is able, unilaterally, to regulate all transactions that it cares about, the net importer has no reason to support any international antitrust agreement, and certainly no agreement that leads to a weaker substantive law. Absent some form of transfer payment, therefore, the net importer prefers to maintain the status quo rather than support an international agreement.

If neither country acts extraterritorially, on the other hand, both countries will have relatively weak rules, and the net exporter will be pleased with the status quo. The net exporter prefers weak rules because such rules give its firms greater freedom and a greater ability to capture profits. An international agreement, therefore, will not get the support of the net exporter unless it implements similarly weak rules (in which case it will fail to satisfy the net importer). In the presence of international trade, therefore, even countries that agree on the appropriate closed economy policy will be unable to agree on an international antitrust regime if their trading patterns differ.

In some circumstances, two or more countries may want the same international antitrust policy. For example, countries with balanced trade in imperfectly competitive goods markets will want their closed economy policy adopted internationally. Thus, countries will have a common view of international antitrust if (1) they have the same closed economy policies; and (2) they have the same trade balance in imperfectly competitive markets (net importer or exporter). With this in mind, it is possible, though by no means certain, that developed countries are sufficiently similar in their trade flows that agreement on international antitrust is possible. When considering North-South negotiations, however, it is difficult to imagine that there can be

agreement. As already mentioned, developed countries tend to export goods in imperfectly competitive markets, while developing countries tend to import those goods. Thus, even if all countries could agree on an optimal closed economy policy, they would not agree on an optimal international antitrust policy. Developed countries would be opposed to an international agreement because they prefer a relatively weak set of international antitrust rules. Developing countries, on the other hand, prefer the adoption of international antitrust policies that are relatively strict. In fact, developing countries have an even greater desire for an agreement because they typically do not apply their laws extraterritorially.²⁸

The divergent interests of developed and developing countries make a negotiated agreement highly unlikely in the absence of some form of transfers from those who stand to benefit from an agreement to those who stand to lose. If transfers are available, however, an agreement is once again possible. If states that prefer an agreement are able to transfer, at low cost, a portion of their gain to the states that prefer the status quo, an agreement may be achieved. Facilitating transfers represents a lowering of transaction costs. As such, it makes an agreement more likely as long as the net effect of an agreement is positive. The next section explains that the TRIPS agreement was possible because transfer payments were made in the form of trade concessions by developed countries.

II. THE LESSON FROM IP

The previous section demonstrates that there is tension between the preferred international antitrust policies of developed and developing countries. If negotiation of an international competition policy agreement is to succeed, negotiators must overcome this tension.

28. The incentives of developed and developing countries discussed here do not always translate directly into political action. In particular, the United States often adopts a different position on international antitrust than does Europe, and developing countries are sometimes less enthusiastic about cooperation than this discussion would suggest. The reasons for these behaviors are subtle, and beyond the scope of this article. In simple terms, states may not behave as one would initially expect based on this discussion because different forms of cooperation generate different results. For example, international antitrust measures whose main effect is to require developing countries to adopt and enforce competition policies within their borders would not serve their interests because it would neither prevent their own firms from being subject to regulation by foreign authorities nor prevent the exploitation of market power by foreign firms within their country. Unless cooperative efforts included some way to give their own consumers protection against foreign firms, therefore, developing countries may not wish to participate. This does not change the fact that they would benefit from international antitrust, but it must be international antitrust that applies equally to all firms.

Fortunately, a very similar strategic relationship among countries existed in IP until an agreement was reached during the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO talks. The IP case study offers a valuable lesson about how competition policy negotiations should proceed.

The negotiating posture of countries in IP is similar to that in competition policy, though it is better understood in the former than in the latter. Countries engaged in a large amount of research and development or who otherwise produce a great deal of intellectual property prefer a system of rigorous protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights around the world. This preference exists because countries take into account the profits of their local IP producers and ignore the benefits of faster and cheaper access to innovation that a weaker regime might offer foreign consumers. These net exporters of intellectual property, therefore, prefer an international regime in which intellectual property rights are relatively expansive and strictly enforced. Just as a desire to protect the interests of local firms leads to a preference for weak antitrust rules, it also leads to a preference for strong IP protections.

Net importers of IP, on the other hand, prefer a relatively low level of protection for IP because they ignore the interests of foreign producers of IP.²⁹ A relatively weak international IP regime gives residents better access to new technologies. This is analogous to net importers of imperfectly competitive goods who prefer a strict international antitrust regime in order to protect local consumers.

Prior to the TRIPS agreement, the negotiating posture of developed and developing countries was precisely that predicted by above theory.³⁰ Developed countries in general and the United States in particular, which are net exporters of IP, sought an international regime with strong protections for IP and reliable enforcement worldwide.³¹ Developing countries, which are net importers of IP, on the other hand, argued for a weaker system of protection and refused to accept any agreement that increased the protection afforded to innovation.

The problem of international IP, therefore, is quite similar to the problem of international antitrust. The one major difference between the

29. Importers have an interest in providing some level of IP protection if doing so encourages innovation because their own consumers benefit from that innovation. Because they ignore the profits enjoyed by innovators, however, they prefer a policy that is weaker than their closed economy policy.

30. See Frederick M. Abbott, *The WTO TRIPs Agreement and Global Economic Development*, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 385, 387-90 (1996).

31. *Id.* at 387-88.

IP case and the antitrust case is that an international agreement was achieved in IP. No comparable deal has ever been reached with respect to antitrust. Examining the case of IP reveals that it was the decision to bring IP within the WTO framework that opened the door to the TRIPS agreement. The lesson is that unless negotiations regarding international antitrust are brought within the WTO or some other mechanism is found to facilitate transfers among states, a substantive agreement is unlikely. The remainder of this section examines the history of international intellectual property and explains how the TRIPS agreement ultimately came about.

Prior to the TRIPS agreement, the most important international IP agreements were the Paris Convention of 1883,³² which addressed industrial property,³³ and the Berne Convention of 1886,³⁴ which dealt with copyright. The primary contribution of these conventions was to streamline the process of registering IP in many countries simultaneously and to adopt the national treatment principle.³⁵ National treatment prohibits discrimination against foreign holders of IP rights, and represented an impressive accomplishment at the time the Paris and Berne Conventions were negotiated. In addition, both conventions established certain minimum standards of IP protection.

The requirement of national treatment in both the Paris and Berne Conventions represented an important step toward cooperation in international IP because it eliminated the ability to explicitly discriminate against foreign IP holders. National treatment, however, does nothing to harmonize the protections offered by the many different domestic IP regimes. A country that has weak protections for its own citizens will also have weak protections for imported works. Ultimately, the lack of substantive international harmonization in IP led to complaints about the Paris and Berne Conventions³⁶ and efforts to reach a new agreement.

TRIPS was the product of the removal of IP negotiations from the

32. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].

33. The term industrial property includes "patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source of appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair competition." Paris Convention, *supra* note 32, art. 1(2).

34. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].

35. Paris Convention, *supra* note 32, art. 2(1); Berne Convention, *supra* note 34, art. 1.

36. See Robert J. Gutowski, *The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International Trade in the TRIPs Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?*, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 713, 724 (1999); Sam Ricketson, *The Future of Traditional Intellectual Property Conventions in the Brave New World of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights*, 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 872, 881 (1995).

World Intellectual Property Organization, a specialized organization focused exclusively on IP, and their incorporation within the WTO framework.³⁷ Prior to the Uruguay Round, international IP issues were negotiated either on a bilateral and regional basis or within WIPO. Because it was specialized, the organization did not have the authority to negotiate transfers in the form of, for example, market access agreements, in exchange for an intellectual property deal. Despite efforts over many years, WIPO failed to generate a multilateral agreement on IP that imposed substantive obligations on all participating countries.³⁸

More than any of its predecessors, the TRIPS agreement represents an attempt to establish meaningful cooperation and harmonization of domestic IP rules.³⁹ The agreement both establishes a set of universal substantive norms and provides an enforcement mechanism through which injured states can sanction states that violate the agreement.⁴⁰ The Paris and Berne Conventions were able to resolve the question of how to permit efficient filing of intellectual property rights in many countries at the same time, which is primarily a matter of coordination. The TRIPS agreement, on the other hand, imposes substantive standards that might be ignored if there were no system of dispute resolution and sanctions behind those standards. Incorporating TRIPS within the WTO makes the dispute settlement procedures of that organization available to complaining countries and, therefore, makes IP commitments more credible. Failure to honor one's commitments triggers the dispute settlement process and, if the offending country does not correct its behavior, sanctions. This is important not only to developed countries who want to ensure that developing countries honor their commitments, but also to developing countries because they cannot offer their

37. Moving the agreement within the WTO not only increased the likelihood of an agreement, as discussed below in the text, it also increased the number of affected countries. For example, Singapore is not a signatory to the Paris and Berne Conventions but is a member of the WTO. See Frank Emmert, *Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round—Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries*, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1339-40 (1990).

38. As previously noted, WIPO has succeeded in establishing a variety of treaties. See <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/index.html> for a list (last visited May 25, 2003).

39. Though the name of the TRIPs agreement, and indeed, the description it is sometimes given, suggests that it is limited to "trade related" aspects of intellectual property, the reality is that the agreement goes beyond trade and trade related issues. See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, *More Power to the WTO?*, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 41, 53-54 (2001).

40. The TRIPs agreement establishes new minimum standards for patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, industrial design, integrated circuit designs, and other intellectual property and incorporates the Paris and Berne Conventions. See Ricketson, *supra* note 36, at 885-91 (providing a summary of the TRIPs agreement).

compliance with IP rules in exchange for other concessions unless their promise to provide enforceable IP rights is credible.

TRIPS increases the rights of IP holders by making infringement of those rights more difficult. In particular, it requires that countries preferring weaker IP protections nevertheless provide the specified minimum level. Understanding that the agreement seeks to prevent developing countries from allowing what in developed countries would be viewed as violations of intellectual property rights raises the question of why developing countries would agree to TRIPS in the first place. These countries have little incentive to accept a stricter international IP regime, and yet they signed the TRIPS agreement. It also raises the related question of why it took so long. Why was the agreement only possible within the WTO and during Uruguay Round? Why did the agreement not emerge out of bilateral and regional negotiations or out of WIPO?

The agreement did not come about prior to its negotiation within the WTO precisely because developing countries prefer a weak international IP regime. These countries tend to be consumers of new technologies rather than producers of it, and, therefore, benefit from a regime that allows the copying of new technologies and their rapid and inexpensive distribution. In other words, developing countries are worse off under TRIPS, at least in the short run. Thus, until the Uruguay Round, they refused to consent to any similar agreement.⁴¹

The ultimate decision by developing countries to consent to TRIPS was not motivated by a belief that greater protection for IP was in the interest of those countries; but rather by a desire to obtain concessions in other areas.⁴² In particular, developing countries wanted and received trade concessions on agricultural subsidies, market access for their own agricultural goods, and protection against unilateral sanctions by developed countries, especially the United States.⁴³ The decision to

41. See, e.g., Gutowski, *supra* note 36, at 751-52 ("TRIPs will produce a rent transfer from developing to developed nations in the short-term.").

42. Developing countries also received some concessions in the TRIPs agreement itself. Most notably, transition periods were built into the agreement to delay the entry into force of most obligations for developing countries. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, arts. 65(1)-(4), 66(1), 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].

43. See Frederick M. Abbott, *Commentary: The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the 21st Century*, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 472 (1996); Abbott, *supra* note 30, at 388; Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, *Better Rules for a New Millennium: A Warning Against Undemocratic Developments in the WTO*, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 547, 548-49 (1999) (explaining how trade concessions enabled TRIPs agreement); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST AND THE WTO: THE LESSON FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 18, 22 (U.C. Berkeley

place the negotiations within the Uruguay Round, therefore, proved critical.⁴⁴ Had IP negotiations remained within the WIPO, negotiators would have been unable to exchange IP concessions by developing countries for trade concessions by developed countries.

The lesson for competition policy should be clear. Like international IP, an agreement on international antitrust is unlikely in the absence of an effective mechanism through which countries are able to make transfer payments.⁴⁵ The most promising way for those transfers to take place is through concessions in other areas.⁴⁶ The WTO is an ideal forum for discussions of such transfers because each round of negotiations implicates a wide range of subjects, allowing countries to make concessions in one area in order to achieve their own objectives in another area. In simple economic terms, the WTO provides a forum for negotiation in which transaction costs are relatively low, making it more likely that negotiators will reach value-increasing agreements.⁴⁷

The inclusion of a dispute resolution system is an additional reason to focus international antitrust negotiations in the WTO, as it allows countries to make more credible commitments. It is difficult to sanction states for a failure to comply with international obligations, yet such sanctions are especially important in the antitrust context because countries prefer to ignore portions of an agreement that harm their own residents. Although the WTO does not provide a complete solution to this problem, the dispute resolution mechanism at least increases the cost of violating commitments because it opens the door for legal sanctions and increases the reputational cost of a violation.

Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 2000-20, 2000) (arguing that the TRIPs agreement was possible because negotiations took place in WTO where transfer payments are possible), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=248317 (last visited May 25, 2003) (on file with the New York University Law Review).

44. See Bronckers, *supra* note 43, at 548-49.

45. This argument is advanced in greater detail in Guzman, *Is International Antitrust Possible?*, *supra* note 2.

46. In theory, of course, transfer payments could take any number of forms, including cash payments, political support, military or economic aid, and so on. In practice, however, such transfers are much easier to negotiate, not to mention politically more palatable, when they take the form of concessions in contemporaneous negotiations. The precise form of the concessions that might be offered depends on the interests of the affected states at the time of the negotiations. States that want an agreement might offer increased access to their own markets through lower tariff bindings, the elimination of some non-tariff barriers, commitment to certain environmental standards, or any other concession valued by those who stand to lose from an agreement.

47. Edward Swaine expresses skepticism that transfers can ever be negotiated, even if one includes negotiations within the WTO. See Edward T. Swaine, *Against Principled Antitrust*, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 959 (2003).

III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR A NON-WTO APPROACH

Although it is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a complete discussion and analysis of the arguments made in support of either the status quo or a stand-alone competition policy forum, this section provides a brief review of those arguments and explains why they are not persuasive. The United States has adopted the position that international competition policy should continue to be negotiated through bilateral and regional agreements rather than through the WTO.⁴⁸ One argument in support of this position might point to the fact that there is already international cooperation in antitrust, and that this cooperation has been achieved in large part through the sort of bilateral and regional cooperation that the United States has in mind.⁴⁹ Negotiators, one may argue, can achieve greater cooperation by continuing down the same path.

Although there is a certain level of cooperation among antitrust authorities today, what currently exists does not rise above procedural cooperation intended to assist local authorities in the prosecution of their own domestic laws. It does not represent a serious move toward cooperation in terms of substantive rules. The difference between minimal cooperative efforts of this sort and the type of substantive cooperation that is often envisioned by scholars and sought by policy makers is enormous. The former is most easily explained as an effort on the part of national regulators to ensure the efficacy of their own local rules. As business becomes more international, domestic antitrust authorities encounter more cases with an international component. Without a certain level of procedural cooperation among regimes, private parties could use national barriers as a shield against prosecution. For example, parties could store incriminating documents in a foreign country, beyond the reach of domestic discovery rules. Similarly, parties could engage in violative conduct abroad, where witnesses are not subject to subpoena. The cooperation we currently see is primarily intended to address these issues. It seeks to encourage the sharing of information among national regulators, to permit the use of discovery procedures abroad, and to minimize the extent to which conflicts arise between the national regulators of two or more countries as they seek to enforce their domestic rules.

48. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INT'L COMPETITION POL'Y ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATT'Y GEN. AND ASSISTANT ATT'Y GEN. FOR ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT (2000), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm> (last visited May 23, 2003).

49. See John J. Parisi, *Enforcement Cooperation Among Antitrust Authorities*, 12 INT'L Q. 691 (2000).

Professor Eleanor Fox favors a non-WTO approach,⁵⁰ arguing that with the exception of private market access restraints,⁵¹ international antitrust issues should be addressed in an independent forum, apart from the WTO.⁵² She focuses on the question of whether competition law issues are appropriately considered “trade” issues. Although she does not provide an explanation or justification, her view appears to be that the WTO should be used exclusively for trade issues.⁵³ Professor Fox recognizes, however, that some antitrust issues are closely related to trade issues, and concedes that these issues should be handled in the same manner as other trade issues. Specifically, she believes that competition laws designed to open markets play the same basic role as liberal trade laws and should be placed within the WTO. For those market access issues, the substantive content of her proposal includes a choice of law rule under which the law of the excluding nation (i.e., the importer) applies to a competition law case. This remedy ignores the strategic questions raised earlier in this article. A system under which the excluding nation’s law applies is a system of extraterritoriality. Where countries apply their laws extraterritorially, net importers have an incentive to over-regulate because their consumers receive all of the benefits of the regulation while foreign producers (at least in part) bear the costs.⁵⁴ These overly strict rules will be the de facto international antitrust regime because extraterritoriality allows a net importer to reach any conduct that affects it.

More important than her proposal regarding market access, however, is Professor Fox’s argument that competition policy rules that do not address market access should be left outside the WTO framework. A non-WTO forum, such as the International Competition Network (ICN),

50. This symposium features an article by Professor Fox in which she appears more sympathetic to negotiation within the WTO than that suggested by her past writing. See Fox, *supra* note 1.

51. Professor Fox identifies three types of market access restraints. They are: “(1) abuse of dominance: exclusions by monopoly or dominant firms, (2) cartels with boycotts, and (3) vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing by the few leading firms in high barrier, concentrated markets.” Fox, *Millennium Round*, *supra* note 3, at 671.

52. *Id.*; FOX, ANTITRUST LAW ON A GLOBAL SCALE, *supra* note 3, at 25-27.

53. “These issues are at the heart of *competition* law, not trade law, and they deserve to be placed on ‘competition’ ground.” Fox, *Millennium Round*, *supra* note 3, at 675.

54. There is also a political economy problem that may prevent local officials from implementing optimal rules. The beneficiaries from a policy of open markets are consumers, a group that is diffuse and poorly organized. Local firms that prefer to prevent the entry of foreign firms, however, can organize more easily and have more at stake—making them a more effective interest group. As a result, one would expect local rules to be overly restrictive.

a forum for competition officials from many states,⁵⁵ has no greater chance of succeeding than did WIPO prior to the Uruguay Round. Because there is no practical way to orchestrate transfer payments, and no established dispute resolution procedure, an agreement on substantive competition policy is unlikely. The ICN may serve other purposes, such as improving communication among agencies, and reducing the costs of low level cooperation, but is no substitute for negotiation in a forum that permits transfers.

Professor Fox offers three objections to placing international antitrust talks within the WTO.⁵⁶ There is something to these objections, but rather than defeating the case for cooperation within the WTO, they suggest some reforms that should be considered within that organization.⁵⁷ Professor Fox's first concern is that negotiations within the WTO would have to include both trade and competition representatives which, she fears, may impede progress on competition issues. Contrary to Professor Fox's concern, the presence of both sets of negotiators is part of the advantage of keeping the talks within the WTO. With both sets of negotiators present, it is easier to negotiate trade-offs in one area in order to get benefits in others, just as the presence of both IP and trade negotiators allowed TRIPS to come about. That said, talks limited to competition policy might serve as a more effective forum for some issues. However, stand-alone forums such as the ICN can accommodate such talks, while the WTO can facilitate negotiation over other issues.

Second, because WTO agreements typically include dispute resolution, Professor Fox expresses concern that some countries may be unwilling to participate if dispute resolution is part of the agreement. This is a fair concern, and there are times when cooperation can be advanced more successfully without the use of dispute resolution procedures. This is not, however, a problem for the negotiation of competition within the WTO, as the relevant agreement could simply specify that it is not subject to the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO.⁵⁸

55. The ICN webpage can be found at <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/> (last visited May 23, 2003).

56. Fox, *Millennium Round*, *supra* note 3, at 677 n.37.

57. For a complete discussion of the challenge of dealing with non-trade issues at the WTO, see Andrew T. Guzman, *Global Governance and the WTO*, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=321365 (last visited May 22, 2003).

58. Several of the WTO Agreements reached during the Uruguay Round provide for dispute resolution procedures that differ from the default rules offered by the DSU. *See, e.g.*, TRIPs Agreement. For a discussion of why states may wish to enter into a binding agreement but prefer to do so without a dispute settlement provision, see Andrew T. Guzman, *The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms*, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303

Professor Tarullo has also spoken in opposition to the inclusion of antitrust within the WTO.⁵⁹ He argues that the inclusion of antitrust within the WTO would be ill-advised because the WTO operates in an overly adversarial manner, and that this environment is poorly suited to “the cooperation among states that will be necessary to address some types of problems concerning international competition policy.”⁶⁰ The essence of his argument appears to be that the WTO is fundamentally a trade organization, and the resulting norms of the organization cannot properly accommodate competition policy.⁶¹

This institutionalist concern regarding the WTO is founded, at least in part, on the view that the WTO as currently structured is ill suited to manage a competition policy agreement. The argument is that the organization is suited to deal with trade issues because these are more adversarial in nature,⁶² and it is poorly suited to handle international regulatory problems.⁶³

This perspective is problematic for at least three reasons. First, it does not adequately consider the potential for change within the WTO. Officials with interests in trade have dominated the WTO because, until the Uruguay Round, the GATT was almost exclusively a trade organization. If it is true that the culture of trade is fundamentally different from regulatory issues such as competition policy, it is no surprise that a trade organization should feature that culture. Bringing competition policy within the WTO would obviously require institutional changes, including the inclusion of people with expertise in that area. There is no question that an institutional change of this sort presents challenges, but on the other hand, there is little reason to think that it cannot be done.

Second, claims that the WTO cannot successfully incorporate regulatory issues are contradicted by the fact that it has already done so with the TRIPS agreement. As discussed above, national incentives in

(2002).

59. See Tarullo, *supra* note 2.

60. Tarullo, *Norms and Institutions*, *supra* note 3, at 479.

61. *Id.* (“Housing a competition agreement in the WTO would inevitably favor the trade norms where the two conflict. Accordingly, forcing the square peg of competition policy into the round hole of trade policy will change the shape of the peg.”).

62. *Id.* (“[T]he rather adversarial character of the WTO system makes it an unpromising vehicle for fostering the cooperation among states that will be necessary to address some types of problems concerning international competition policy.”).

63. See *id.* at 489 (“The WTO is not designed to help governments act more effectively to address a shared regulatory problem. The objective of the trade ministries that dominate WTO activities is the elimination of certain government practices, not their coordination.”).

IP are quite similar to those in antitrust. The success of TRIPS, therefore, suggests that there is hope for an antitrust agreement as well.

Finally, there is no reason to think that the pursuit of international antitrust is somehow less adversarial than the pursuit of free trade. In both cases national delegations can be expected to represent the interests of their own governments, and in both cases concessions in one area are often needed in order to get agreement in another. If anything, negotiations over international antitrust may be more adversarial than trade negotiations because we know that free trade increases the welfare of all countries and that resistance to free trade is primarily the result of the political economy of trade. In contrast, the analysis in this article has shown that an antitrust agreement will impose costs on some countries.

The ongoing Doha Round of WTO negotiations has placed competition policy on its agenda. This raises the question of what should be included in any future agreement. A detailed discussion of this important question is beyond the scope of this article, but it is worth noting a few points. First, a national treatment principle would be an important early step toward ensuring sound competition policies. Although a national treatment requirement would not address the strategic choice of domestic law by trading nations, it would prevent the most explicit attempts to favor locals over foreigners such as exemptions for export cartels. Second, an international agreement should encourage private rights of action. Competition policy often suffers from political involvement and interference, and the existence of a private right of action would, like the national treatment principle, promote the equal treatment of all affected parties.⁶⁴ Additional obligations would have to be added to an antitrust agreement, including rules to ensure transparency and minimum substantive standards. These are left to another day.⁶⁵

IV. CONCLUSION

This article has not attempted to identify or address all-important questions in the international antitrust debate. Its limited aim has been to advance the case for the inclusion of competition policy within the WTO, rather than in a stand-alone forum. The basic structure of the argument is simple. Multilateral agreement on international antitrust is

64. In other writings I have argued for both national treatment and private rights of action in a more generalized context that would also apply to antitrust. See Andrew T. Guzman, *Choice of Law: New Foundations*, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 (2002).

65. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST (Social Science Research Network, U.C. Berkeley Public Law Working Paper No. 128, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=412300 (last visited June 13, 2003).

unlikely in the absence of transfer payments paid from those countries that stand to benefit from such an agreement to those countries that stand to lose. The WTO provides a ready-made system through which transfer payments can be made. The potential payoff from inclusion in the WTO is demonstrated by the history of intellectual property. After many years of failure, negotiators achieved international cooperation, in the form of the TRIPS agreement, only when negotiations were incorporated within the WTO.

Support for a WTO solution to international competition policy concerns should not be mistaken for a rejection of other approaches. For example, national authorities should continue to seek bilateral cooperation on issues that are amenable to bilateral efforts. In the end, however, it seems unlikely that large scale progress on international antitrust can come about without some form of transfers like the type made possible within the WTO.

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