EU competition law and economics / Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit.
2012
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Author
Title
EU competition law and economics / Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit.
Added Author
Edition
1st ed.
Imprint
Oxford, U.K. : Oxford University Press, 2012.
Description
1 online resource
Formatted Contents Note
Introduction
Elements of competition law economics
The law and economics of anticompetitive coordination
Abuse of dominance
Enforcement, institutions, and procedure
Cartels and other horizontal hardcore restrictions
Horizontal cooperation agreements
The law and economics of vertical restraints
Merger control.
Elements of competition law economics
The law and economics of anticompetitive coordination
Abuse of dominance
Enforcement, institutions, and procedure
Cartels and other horizontal hardcore restrictions
Horizontal cooperation agreements
The law and economics of vertical restraints
Merger control.
Summary
This EU competition law treatise fully integrates economic reasoning in its treatment of the decisional practice of the European Commission and the case-law of the European Court of Justice. Since the European Commission's move to a "more economic approach" to competition law reasoning and decisional practice, the use of economic argument in competition law cases has become a stricter requirement. Many national competition authorities are also increasingly moving away from a legalistic analysis of a firm's conduct to an effect-based analysis of such conduct, indeed most competition cases today involve teams composed of lawyers and industrial organisation economists.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Source of Description
Title from print version.
Available in Other Form
Access Note
Access restricted to subscribing institutions.
Linked Resources
Alternate Title
Oxford Competition Law.
Language
English
ISBN
9780199566563 (print)
0199566569 (print)
0199566569 (print)
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