Oxford legal philosophy. Oxford scholarship online.
Coercion and the Nature of Law argues that it is a conceptually necessary condition for something to count as a system of law according to our conceptual practices that it authorizes the imposition of coercive sanctions for violations of some mandatory norms governing non-official behaviour (the Coercion Thesis). The book begins with an explication of the modest approach to conceptual analysis that is deployed throughout. The remainder of the book is concerned to show that an institutional normative system is not reasonably contrived to do anything that law must be able to do for us to make sense of why we adopt systems of law to regulate non-official behaviour, unless we assume that mandatory norms governing that behavior are backed by the threat of a sovereign.
Also issued in print: 2020.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Digital File Characteristics
Source of Description
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on May 27, 2020).