9781139381260 (ebook) 9781107031135 (hardback)
Comparative constitutional law and policy.
This book argues that national and international courts seek to enhance their reputations through the strategic exercise of judicial power. Courts often cannot enforce their judgments and must rely on reputational sanctions to ensure compliance. One way to do this is for courts to improve their reputation for generating compliance with their judgments. When the court's reputation is increased, parties will be expected to comply with its judgments and the reputational sanction on a party that fails to comply will be higher. This strategy allows national and international courts, which cannot enforce their judgments against states and executives, to improve the likelihood that their judgments will be complied with over time. This book describes the judicial tactics that courts use to shape their judgments in ways that maximize their reputational gains.
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Formatted Contents Note
Introduction : Courts as long-term strategic actors that seek to maximize their reputations A theory of the reputations of courts Constraints on courts Tactics to increase courts' reputation National court case study : Israeli Supreme Court International court case study : European Court of Human Rights When compliance is irrelevant.