9781139167345 (ebook) 9780521859561 (hardback) 9780521676861 (paperback)
For millennia, policymakers and statesmen have grappled with questions about the concept of victory in war. How long does it take to achieve victory and how do we know when victory is achieved? And, as highlighted by the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, is it possible to win a war and yet lose the peace? The premise of this book is that we do not have a modern theory about victory and that, in order to answer these questions, we need one. This book explores historical definitions of victory, how victory has evolved, and how it has been implemented in war. It also subsequently develops the intellectual foundations of a modern pre-theory of victory, and discusses the military instruments necessary for victory in the twenty-first century using case studies that include US military intervention in Panama, Libya, Persian Gulf War, Bosnia/Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Formatted Contents Note
Historical origins of victory Modern origins of victory Foundations of victory America's theory of victory 1986 Raid on Libya 1989 Invasion of Panama 1991 Persian Gulf war Bosnia and Kosovo, 1992-1999 2001 Invasion of Afghanistan 2003 Invasion of Iraq Military power and victory.