9781139424530 (ebook) 9781107032064 (hardback) 9781107610026 (paperback)
The war of June 1967 between Israel and Arab states was widely perceived as being forced on Israel to prevent the annihilation of its people by Arab armies hovering on its borders. Documents now declassified by key governments question this view. The UK, USSR, France and the USA all knew that the Arab states were not in attack mode and tried to dissuade Israel from attacking. In later years, this war was held up as a precedent allowing an attack on a state that is expected to attack. It has even been used to justify a pre-emptive assault on a state expected to attack well in the future. Given the lack of evidence that it was waged by Israel in anticipation of an attack by Arab states, the 1967 war can no longer serve as such a precedent. This book seeks to provide a corrective on the June 1967 war.
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Formatted Contents Note
Who was to blame and why it matters The Syrian connection Egypt flexes its muscle Historical opportunity for Israel Britain has a plan Southern passage: Aqaba as cause for war "The Americans will not sit shiva" How to attack: "we have to be the victims" Turkey shoot Cover-up in the Security Council Security Council "in the dark" Cover-up in the General Assembly How to read the silence on aggression The experts fall in line No threat? No matter War by mistake Defending in advance A new doctrine of preventive war Permanent takeover? Blocking the path to peace.