9781139583725 (ebook) 9781107037083 (hardback)
This book addresses gaps in thinking and practice on how the private sector can both help and hinder the process of building peace after armed conflict. It argues that weak governance in fragile and conflict-affected societies creates a need for international authorities to regulate the social impact of business activity in these places as a special interim duty. Policymaking should seek appropriate opportunities to engage with business while harnessing its positive contributions to sustainable peace. However, scholars have not offered frameworks for what is considered 'appropriate' engagement or properly theorised techniques for how best to influence responsible business conduct. United Nations peace operations are peak symbols of international regulatory responsibilities in conflict settings, and debate continues to grow around the private sector's role in development generally. This book is the first to study how peace operations have engaged with business to influence its peace-building impact.
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Formatted Contents Note
Machine generated contents note: pt. I CONTEXT 1. Business and Peace: Describing the Gap 1.1. Regulation 1.1.1. General: Matching Private Influence with Public Accountability 1.1.2. Specific: Existing Schemes to Regulate Business Impact on Peace 1.2. Law 1.2.1. International Law and Business Responsibility 1.2.2. International Law and Post-Conflict Situations 1.3. Policy 1.3.1. Policy Frameworks on Fragile States and Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices 1.3.2. Policy Frameworks on Engaging the Business Sector in Peace and Development 1.4. Literature 1.4.1. The Political Economy of Peace and Conflict 1.4.2. Peacebuilding and the Business Sector: The General Gap 1.4.3. Peacebuilding and the Business Sector: The Specific Gap pt. II PRACTICE 2. The Gap in Peace Operation Mandates, Strategies, and Practice 2.1. The Evolution of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding 2.1.1. A Working Typology of Peace Operations 2.1.2. Peace Operations as Regulators: Existing and Analogous Practice 2.2. Identifying the Gap: The Lack of Explicit Mandates to Engage Business 2.2.1. Identifying the Gap: Findings 2.2.2. Illustrating the Gap: Examples 3. East Timor/Timor-Leste 1999 2009 3.1. Context 3.1.1. Before 1999: Colonisation, Occupation, Conflict 3.1.2. After 1999: The Task Facing UNTAET 3.2. Actions: UNTAET as a Transitional Business Regulator 3.2.1. Generic Business Regulation by UNTAET 3.2.2. UNTAET and the Impact of Business on Peacebuilding 3.3. Omissions: UNTAET's Legacy of UN Neglect of the Business Sector 3.3.1. Failure to Engage the Business Sector: Patterns 3.3.2. Failure to Engage the Business Sector: Reasons 3.4. Evaluation 3.4.1. Lost Opportunities: Two Examples 3.4.2. Lost Opportunities: The Peacebuilding Legacy 4. Liberia 2003 2013 4.1. Context 4.1.1. Slavery and Statehood: Violence and Plunder 4.1.2. Civil Conflicts: `The Business of War' and Sanctions 4.1.3. The 2003 Peace Agreement and Creation of UNMIL 4.1.4. 2003: The Challenge Facing UNMIL 4.2. Actions: UNMIL as a Regulator of Sanctions-Affected Sectors 4.2.1. Diamonds 4.2.2. Timber 4.3. Actions: UNMIL as a Regulator of the Rubber Sector 4.3.1. The Rubber Task Force 4.3.2. Balancing Community and Concessionary Interests 4.4. Omissions: UNMIL and Contract-Making by the Transitional Government 4.4.1. The Major Resource Contract Negotiations 4.4.2. Evaluation of UNMIL Inaction on Contract-Making 4.5. Omissions: Examples of Lost Opportunities to Engage the Business Sector 4.5.1. The Capital: Non-Engagement with Liberian Business Groups 4.5.2. The Counties: UNMIL and `Funny Games' in Buchanan 4.5.3. The Iron Ore Sector: Security Engagement and No More 4.6. Evaluation pt. III THEORY 5. A Theory of Transitional Business Regulation 5.1. Theories of Responsive Regulation and Networked Governance 5.1.1. Responsive Regulation Theory 5.1.2. The Regulatory `Pyramid' 5.1.3. Networked Nodal Governance 5.2. A Theory of Transitional Business Regulation 5.2.1. Attribute A: `RESPONSIVE' 5.2.2. Attribute B: `RESPONSIBLE' 5.2.3. Attribute C: `REALISTIC' 6. The Policy Basis for a Transitional Regulatory Role 6.1. Facing the `Compliance Trap' 6.2. Responsibility in Regulation of the Business Sector 6.2.1. The Undue Influence Critique 6.2.2. The `Capture' or Corruption Critique 6.2.3. The `Turn to Ethics' Critique 6.3. Regulatory Roles for Outsiders in Post-Conflict Societies 6.3.1. Questions of Effectiveness 6.3.2. Questions of Legitimacy 6.4. Reinforcing the Policy Foundations of Transitional Business Regulation 6.4.1. Between the Ostrich and the Trojan Horse 6.42. Moving beyond Critical Apprehensions 6.4.3. The UN Security Council and Regulatory Roles for Peace Operations pt. IV FUTURE 7. Incipient Practice by Peace Operations 7.1. Despite the Gap: Signs of Incipient Regulation of Business for Peace 7.1.1. Implicit Mandates 7.1.2. Examples of Incipient Practice 7.2. Closing the Gap? Emerging Practice in Special Political Missions 7.2.1. The Integrated Peacebuilding Missions in Africa 7.2.2. The UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) 8. Implementing Transitional Business Regulation 8.1. Seeing Like a Regulator: Regulatory Disposition 8.1.1. Regulatory Disposition 8.1.2. Seeing Like a Regulator 8.1.3. Mandating Transitional Business Regulation 8.2. Seeing Business: `Responsible' Regulation and Principled Engagement 8.2.1. A Blind-Spot for the Business Sector 8.2.2. Future Encounters: Interaction as Regulation 8.2.3. Responsibility in Engaging with Business 8.3. Seeing Others: `Responsive' Regulation and Networked Governance 8.3.1. From Theory to Practice in Networking Business for Peace 8.3.2. Addressing Practical Difficulties 8.4. Seeing Clearly: `Realistic' Regulation and Gradually `Muddling Through'.