This monograph aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the legal protection of the private equity (PE) investors in China. In an academic sense, this research mainly focuses on the agency problems in the life cycle of PE investment under the business organization law system in China. Briefly speaking, the agency problems of PE investment derive from the two-level separation of ownership and control, one of which is the principal-agent relationship between the PE investors and the fund manager, and the other is the principal-agent relationship between the PE shareholders and the management of investee companies. It is the first research to provide an in-depth examination on the investor protection in the PE investment under the business organization law system in China.
Formatted Contents Note
Cover; Half Title; Series Information; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of contents; Figures; Tables; Legislations; Cases; Abbreviations; Preface; Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction; Notes; 2 The agency problems in private equity organizations; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The nature of the firm and agency problems in private equity organizations; 2.2.1 The contractual theory of the firm in the context of social transformation; 22.214.171.124 The firm as a 'nexus of contracts'; 126.96.36.199 The statutory form of firms as standardized contracts; 2.2.2 The agency problems in private equity investments 2.3 Fiduciary duties as solvers to agency problems in business organization law2.3.1 Fiduciary duties as default rules in commercial law; 2.3.2 The limitations of the fiduciary duty regime; 188.8.131.52 The uncertainty in the application of fiduciary duties; 184.108.40.206 The barrier to the legal transplantation of fiduciary duties; 2.4 The political economy of China's private equity sector; 2.4.1 The economic and financial transitions in contemporary China; 2.4.2 The status quo of private equity in China; 2.4.3 The role of State in Chinese Private Equity Industry 2.5 Agency problems of private equity and limitations of the judiciary in China2.6 The methodological aspects of the research: a response to Chinese economy; 2.6.1 The appropriateness of the theoretical foundation; 2.6.2 The appropriateness of the referential system for analysis; Notes; 3 The protection for limited partners of private equity limited partnerships; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The features of limited partnerships: historical and legal-economic analysis; 3.2.1 The origins of limited partnership in the history of English law 3.2.2 The legal-economic analysis of limited partnerships: security and efficiency220.127.116.11 The moderate separation of ownership and control; a. The exclusion of unprofessional intervention: Management efficiency; b. The profit sharing between GPs and LPs: Reduction of agency costs; 18.104.22.168 Organic bond of limited and unlimited liabilities: transaction security; a. Limited liability of contributors: Efficient fundraising; b. Unlimited joint and several liabilities of controllers: Efficient management; 3.3 The landscape of China's PE limited partnerships 3.3.1 Chinese legislators' early attitude towards limited partnerships (1990s)3.3.2 Early practices of limited partnerships in China's PE market (2001-2005); 3.3.3 The limited partnerships under the new Partnership Law (2006-2010s); 22.214.171.124 Basic principles of limited partnerships in China; 126.96.36.199 An overview of the PE limited partnership in contemporary China; 3.4 The risks in the governance of private equity limited partnerships in China; 3.4.1 The ineffective unlimited liability deterrence of the practitioners of GPs
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