9780191023460 (electronic book) 0191023469 (electronic book) 9780198714064
We are deeply social creatures. Our core social needs--for meaningful social inclusion--are more important than our civil and political needs and our economic welfare needs, and we won't secure those other things if our core social needs go unmet. Our core social needs ground a human right against social deprivation as well as a human right to have the resources to sustain other people. Kimberley Brownlee defends this fundamental but largely neglected human right; having defined social deprivation as a persistent lack of minimally adequate access to decent human contact, she then discusses situations such as solitary confinement and incidental isolation. Fleshing out what it means to belong, Brownlee considers why loneliness and weak social connections are not just moral tragedies, but often injustices, and argues that we endure social contribution injustice when we are denied the means to sustain others. Our core social needs can clash with our interests in interactive and associative freedom, and when they do, social needs take priority. We have a duty to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to satisfy their social needs. As Brownlee asserts, we violate this duty if we classify some people as inescapably socially threatening, either through using reductive, essentialist language that reduces people to certain acts or traits--'criminal', 'rapist', 'paedophile', 'foreigner'--or in the ways we physically segregate such people and fail to help people to reintegrate after segregation.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Formatted Contents Note
1. Social Beings Introduction 1.1 Social Needs 1.2 Empirical Arguments 1.3 Phenomenological Arguments 1.4 Respect-Based Arguments 1.5 Social Needs versus Social Desires Conclusion 2. Social Deprivation Introduction 2.1 What Is Social Deprivation? 2.2 The Neglect of the Right against Social Deprivation 2.3 The Human Right against Social Deprivation 2.4 Arguments for the Human Right against Social Deprivation 2.5 Duty-Bearers 2.6 Objections Conclusion 3. Sustaining Others Introduction 3.1 The Need to Sustain 3.2 Social Abilities 3.3 Social Opportunities 3.4 Social Connections 3.5 Indirect Victims 3.6 The Darker Side of Our Need to Sustain Conclusion 4. Interactional Freedom Introduction 4.1 The Nature of Interactional Freedom 4.2 The Value of Interactional Freedom Conclusion 5. Dilemmas of Sociability Introduction 5.1 The Value of Associational Freedom_ Exclusivity 5.2 What If Everyone Did That? 5.3 Three Negative Dilemmas 5.4 Three Positive Dilemmas 5.5 Social Attitudes Conclusion 6. Associational Freedom Introduction 6.1 Moral Permissions 6.2 Morally Wrong Associations 6.3 Moral Claim-Rights Conclusion 7. Moral Messiness Introduction: Three Stories 7.1 Moral Messiness 7.2 Piggybackers versus Parasites 7.3 Why Moral Messiness Is a Problem 7.4 Possible Solutions Conclusion 8. Segregation Introduction 8.1 The Language We Use 8.2 The People We Incarcerate 8.3 The Harms of Segregation 8.4 Forfeited Rights and Infringed Rights 8.5 Objections Conclusion.
Digital File Characteristics
Source of Description
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed June 30, 2020).
Available in Other Form
Print version: Brownlee, Kimberley Being Sure of Each Other : An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms Oxford : Oxford University Press USA - OSO,c2020