The judicial tug of war :: how lawyers, politicians, and ideological incentives shape the American judiciary /: Adam Bonica, Stanford University, California, Maya Sen, Harvard University, Massachusetts.

Name: The judicial tug of war : how lawyers, politicians, and ideological incentives shape the American judiciary / Adam Bonica, Stanford University, California, Maya Sen, Harvard University, Massachusetts.
ISBN: 9781108894005

Bonica, Adam,; Sen, Maya,

The judicial tug of war : how lawyers, politicians, and ideological incentives shape the American judiciary / Adam Bonica, Stanford University, California, Maya Sen, Harvard University, Massachusetts.

Bonica, Adam, author.; Sen, Maya, author.

2021

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Author

Bonica, Adam, author.

Title

The judicial tug of war : how lawyers, politicians, and ideological incentives shape the American judiciary / Adam Bonica, Stanford University, California, Maya Sen, Harvard University, Massachusetts.

Added Author

Sen, Maya, author.

Imprint

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Description

1 online resource (xvi, 314 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Series

Political economy of institutions and decisions.

Formatted Contents Note

Introduction: The tug of war over the American judiciary
The "American Aristocracy"
The Bar, self-regulation, and judicial capture
Politicians, their interests, and the judicial tug of war
Political incentives and politicization in the Federal Courts
Politicization in the States and across judicial selection mechanisms
The politics of judicial reform
The tug of war, polarization, and judicial conflict
The relationship between the tug of war and polarization
Conclusion: American courts in times of increasing polarization.

Summary

Why have conservatives decried 'activist judges'? And why have liberals - and America's powerful legal establishment - emphasized qualifications and experience over ideology? This transformative text tackles these questions with a new framework for thinking about the nation's courts, 'the judicial tug of war', which not only explains current political clashes over America's courts, but also powerfully predicts the composition of courts moving forward. As the text demonstrates through novel quantitative analyses, a greater ideological rift between politicians and legal elites leads politicians to adopt measures that put ideology and politics front and center - for example, judicial elections. On the other hand, ideological closeness between politicians and the legal establishment leads legal elites to have significant influence on the selection of judges. Ultimately, the judicial tug of war makes one point clear: for good or bad, politics are critical to how judges are selected and whose interests they ultimately represent.

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Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 14 Dec 2020).

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Access provided by Berkeley Law Library

Alternate Title

Cambridge Books Online.

Language

English