Economics and Liability for Environmental Problems / Kathleen Segerson.
2017
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Details
Title
Economics and Liability for Environmental Problems / Kathleen Segerson.
Edition
First edition.
Imprint
London : Taylor and Francis, 2017.
Description
1 online resource (pages).
Series
Routledge revivals.
Formatted Contents Note
Part, The Role of Liability
chapter 1 Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
chapter 2 Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety
chapter 3 A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules Under Imperfect Information
chapter 4 A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation
part, The Incentive Effects of Liability
chapter 5 Strict Liability Versus Negligence
chapter 6 Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting
chapter 7 When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?
chapter 8 Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model
chapter 9 On liability and insurance
chapter 10 The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence
chapter 11 Bankruptcy and care choice
chapter 12 Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries
part, I Theory
part, Conceptual Models
chapter 13 The Effects of Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate Development
chapter 14 Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital
chapter 15 Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors*
chapter 16 Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability
chapter 17 Liability for Groundwater Contamination from Pesticides
chapter 18 The Structure of Penalties in Environmental Enforcement: An Economic Analysis
part, Empirical Models
chapter 19 Controlling stochastic pollution events through liability rules: some evidence from OCS leasing
chapter 20 Risk Premiums for Environmental Liability: Does Superfund Increase the Cost of Capital? 1
chapter 21 Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste Management: Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data
chapter 22 Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards
part, Liability Reform
chapter 23 Environmental Liability Reform and Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe
chapter 24 Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear Accidents: Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions
part, II Applications.
chapter 1 Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
chapter 2 Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety
chapter 3 A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules Under Imperfect Information
chapter 4 A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation
part, The Incentive Effects of Liability
chapter 5 Strict Liability Versus Negligence
chapter 6 Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting
chapter 7 When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?
chapter 8 Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model
chapter 9 On liability and insurance
chapter 10 The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence under Strict Liability and under Negligence
chapter 11 Bankruptcy and care choice
chapter 12 Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries
part, I Theory
part, Conceptual Models
chapter 13 The Effects of Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate Development
chapter 14 Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital
chapter 15 Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors*
chapter 16 Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability
chapter 17 Liability for Groundwater Contamination from Pesticides
chapter 18 The Structure of Penalties in Environmental Enforcement: An Economic Analysis
part, Empirical Models
chapter 19 Controlling stochastic pollution events through liability rules: some evidence from OCS leasing
chapter 20 Risk Premiums for Environmental Liability: Does Superfund Increase the Cost of Capital? 1
chapter 21 Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste Management: Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data
chapter 22 Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards
part, Liability Reform
chapter 23 Environmental Liability Reform and Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe
chapter 24 Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear Accidents: Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions
part, II Applications.
Summary
"This title was first published in 2002. This convenient reference brings together notable contributions examining all aspects of the liability for environmental accidents. Articles included in the Part I of this volume examine the role of liability as a policy instrument, and provide detailed examinations of the incentive effects created by the imposition of liability, ie. Bankruptcy, litigation costs, delegation of responsibility and insurance. Those in Part II study specific environmental issues such as hazardous waste disposal and oil spills. The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy explores the influence of economics on the development of environmental and natural resource policy. In a series of twenty five volumes, the most significant journal essays in key areas of the contemporary environmental and resource policy are collected. This convenient reference brings together the notable contributions examining all aspects of the liability for environmental accidents."--Provided by publisher.
Source of Description
OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
Location
www
Alternate Title
Taylor & Francis Online
Language
English
ISBN
9781315188133 (e-book)
1315188139
9781351742191
1351742191
9781351742177
1351742175
1138730637
9781138730632
1315188139
9781351742191
1351742191
9781351742177
1351742175
1138730637
9781138730632
Record Appears in