The unitary executive theory : a danger to constitutional government / Jeffrey Crouch, Mark J. Rozell, and Mitchel A. Sollenberger.
2020
KF5050 .C79 2020 (Mapit)
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Details
Author
Title
The unitary executive theory : a danger to constitutional government / Jeffrey Crouch, Mark J. Rozell, and Mitchel A. Sollenberger.
Imprint
Lawrence, Kansas : University Press of Kansas, [2020]
Copyright
©2020
Description
ix, 212 pages ; 24 cm
Formatted Contents Note
Introduction : a flawed theory with dangerous consequences
Presidential power and the unitary executive theory
Domestic powers: Part I
Domestic powers: Part II
Domestic powers: Part III
Foreign affairs powers: Part I
Foreign affairs powers: Part II
Conclusion.
Presidential power and the unitary executive theory
Domestic powers: Part I
Domestic powers: Part II
Domestic powers: Part III
Foreign affairs powers: Part I
Foreign affairs powers: Part II
Conclusion.
Summary
"In July 2019, President Donald J. Trump claimed at a student summit that the Constitution's Article II means 'I have the right to do whatever I want as president.' While such a statement would have shocked the framers of the Constitution, it represents the working assumption of most modern presidents and has been given scholarly articulation over the past thirty years in what is known as the unitary executive theory. Proponents of this theory believe in a strong, vigorous presidency endowed with various unilateral powers. They think that the president controls any and all constitutional executive functions, and that Congress cannot check the president when exercising executive powers. The theory emerged in a weak form under the Reagan administration and in a stronger form under George W. Bush, and the Trump presidency represents its logical extension. Jeffrey Crouch, Mark J. Rozell, and Mitchel A. Sollenberger argue that the unitary executive theory stands in opposition to the Constitution and serves to justify presidential actions that violate the constitutional principles of separated powers and checks and balances. In this study, they explore the history of the theory's emergence and examine the chief executive's domestic and foreign affairs powers to show that the president does not exercise unitary control, despite the erosion of constitutional limits. While advocates of the theory argue that greater presidential power will make government more efficient, the results have shown otherwise. [This book] offers a primer on presidential power and presents a robust case for the return to our constitutional limits"-- Provided by the publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Call Number
KF5050 .C79 2020
Language
English
ISBN
9780700630035 hardcover
0700630031 hardcover
9780700630042 paperback
070063004X paperback
9780700630059 electronic publication
0700630031 hardcover
9780700630042 paperback
070063004X paperback
9780700630059 electronic publication
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