The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lam v. University of Hawaiʻi is the “high water mark” of intersectional Title VII jurisprudence. In Lam, the Ninth Circuit explicitly adopted an intersectional framework, reprimanded courts for bisecting intersectional identities in Title VII claims, and cited Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw’s seminal article on intersectionality in employment discrimination. But, under this clear green light to embrace intersectionality, have courts done so?

This Note suggests not. Despite thirty years since Lam, courts have struggled to conceptualize the intersectional identities of plaintiffs and the multifaceted discrimination they face. While intersectionality has become an increasingly popular concept in the mainstream media, academia, and even with the general public, courts in the Ninth Circuit have meagerly developed intersectional doctrine in the thirty years since Lam and often flat-out disobey Lam’s holding to retreat from intersectionality all together.

This Note begins with a brief summary of intersectionality as a legal framework then situates Lam within the existing circuit court split on intersectionality in Title VII claims. I break down the Lam opinion’s rich intersectional holdings and explain how courts in the Ninth Circuit have interpreted Lam. Here, I offer a descriptive analysis that categorizes court decisions by the scope of intersectionality permitted and the treatment of intersectional evidence. By analyzing how courts within the Ninth Circuit implemented Lam, this Note unearths how courts have come to understand intersectional discrimination as a whole. Lastly, I identify doctrinal and policy reforms necessary to properly adjudicate intersectional claims and illuminate the green-light of Lam.