Economic models of law / Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker.
2014
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Author
Title
Economic models of law / Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker.
Added Author
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Imprint
Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd., 2014.
Description
1 online resource (1 volumes) ; cm.
Series
Elgaronline.
Formatted Contents Note
Recommended readings (Machine generated): Bebchuk, L. 1984. Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information. Rand Journal of Economics 15: 404-15
Brown, J. 1973. Toward an Economic Theory of Liability. Journal of Legal Studies 2: 323-49
Calabresi, G. 1961. Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, Yale Law Journal 70: 499-553
Calabresi, G. and A. Douglas Melamed. 1972. Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral. Harvard Law Review 85: 1089-128
Coase, R. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44
Coase, R. 1978. Economics and Contiguous Disciplines. Journal of Legal Stuidies 7: 201-11
Cooter, R. 1985. Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution. California Law Review 73: 1-51
Friedman, M. 1953. The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Hirshleifer, J. 1971. The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity. American Economic Review 61: 561-74
Landes, W. 1971. An Economic Analysis of the Courts. Journal of Law and Economics 14: 61-107
Landes, W. 2005. The Art of Law and Economics: An Autobiographical Essay, in F. Parisi and C. Rowley, eds., The Origins of Law and Economics. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar
Mercuro, N. and S. Medema. 1997. Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Nicholson, W. and C. Snyder. 2012. Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions. Mason, OH: South-Western
Posner, R. 1972. A Theory of Negligence. Journal of Legal Studies 1: 29-96
Posner, R. 2003. Economic Analysis of Law, 6th Edition. New York: Aspen Law & Business
Posner, R. 2005. The Law and Economics Movement: From Bentham to Becker, in F. Parisi and C. Rowley, eds., The Origins of Law and Economics. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar
Shavell, S. 1980. Damage Measures for Breach of Contract. Bell Journal of Economics 11: 466-90
Shavell, S. 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press
Robert Cooter (1985), 'Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution', California Law Review, 73 (1), January, 1-51.
Donald Wittman (1981), 'Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law', Journal of Legal Studies, 10 (1), January, 65-91
A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson (1983), 'Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power', Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (2), Autumn, 581-9
Steven Shavell (1984), 'A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation', RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (2), Summer, 271-80
Keith N. Hylton (1990), 'The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence', International Review of Law and Economics, 10, 161-71
Kathryn E. Spier (2011), 'Product Safety, Buybacks, and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 27 (3), 515-39
Russell Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (1985), 'Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard', RAND Journal of Economics, 16 (1), Spring, 103-113
Steven Shavell (1994), 'Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale', RAND Journal of Economics, 25 (1), Spring, 20-36
Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung (1999), 'Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments', RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (1), Spring, 84-105
Dean Lueck (1995), 'The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVIII (2), October, 393-436
Matthew J. Baker (2003), 'An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies', Journal of Political Economy, 111 (1), February, 124-73
Matthew Baker and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), 'Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 56 (1), 77-102
Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro (1984), 'The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99 (1), February, 71-92
Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson (1994), 'Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?', Journal of Legal Studies, XXIII (2), June, 749-76
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1989), 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law', Journal of Legal Studies, XVIII (2), June, 325-63
Paul Klemperer (1990), 'How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?', RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1), Spring, 113-30
Gary S. Becker (1968), 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', Journal of Political Economy, 76 (2), March-April, 169-217
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), 'The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVIII (1), March, 45-76
William J. Furlong (1987), 'A General Equilibrium Model of Crime Commission and Prevention', Journal of Public Economics, 34 (1), 87-103
Jennifer F. Reinganum (1988), 'Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion', American Economic Review, 78 (4), September, 713-28.
Barry Nalebluff (1987), 'Credible Pretrial Negotiation', RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (2), Summer, 198-210
Avery Katz (1990), 'The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation', International Review of Law and Economics, 10, 3-27.
Brown, J. 1973. Toward an Economic Theory of Liability. Journal of Legal Studies 2: 323-49
Calabresi, G. 1961. Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, Yale Law Journal 70: 499-553
Calabresi, G. and A. Douglas Melamed. 1972. Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral. Harvard Law Review 85: 1089-128
Coase, R. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44
Coase, R. 1978. Economics and Contiguous Disciplines. Journal of Legal Stuidies 7: 201-11
Cooter, R. 1985. Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution. California Law Review 73: 1-51
Friedman, M. 1953. The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Hirshleifer, J. 1971. The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity. American Economic Review 61: 561-74
Landes, W. 1971. An Economic Analysis of the Courts. Journal of Law and Economics 14: 61-107
Landes, W. 2005. The Art of Law and Economics: An Autobiographical Essay, in F. Parisi and C. Rowley, eds., The Origins of Law and Economics. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar
Mercuro, N. and S. Medema. 1997. Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Nicholson, W. and C. Snyder. 2012. Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions. Mason, OH: South-Western
Posner, R. 1972. A Theory of Negligence. Journal of Legal Studies 1: 29-96
Posner, R. 2003. Economic Analysis of Law, 6th Edition. New York: Aspen Law & Business
Posner, R. 2005. The Law and Economics Movement: From Bentham to Becker, in F. Parisi and C. Rowley, eds., The Origins of Law and Economics. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar
Shavell, S. 1980. Damage Measures for Breach of Contract. Bell Journal of Economics 11: 466-90
Shavell, S. 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press
Robert Cooter (1985), 'Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution', California Law Review, 73 (1), January, 1-51.
Donald Wittman (1981), 'Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law', Journal of Legal Studies, 10 (1), January, 65-91
A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson (1983), 'Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power', Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (2), Autumn, 581-9
Steven Shavell (1984), 'A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation', RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (2), Summer, 271-80
Keith N. Hylton (1990), 'The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence', International Review of Law and Economics, 10, 161-71
Kathryn E. Spier (2011), 'Product Safety, Buybacks, and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 27 (3), 515-39
Russell Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (1985), 'Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard', RAND Journal of Economics, 16 (1), Spring, 103-113
Steven Shavell (1994), 'Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale', RAND Journal of Economics, 25 (1), Spring, 20-36
Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung (1999), 'Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments', RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (1), Spring, 84-105
Dean Lueck (1995), 'The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVIII (2), October, 393-436
Matthew J. Baker (2003), 'An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies', Journal of Political Economy, 111 (1), February, 124-73
Matthew Baker and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), 'Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 56 (1), 77-102
Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro (1984), 'The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99 (1), February, 71-92
Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson (1994), 'Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?', Journal of Legal Studies, XXIII (2), June, 749-76
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1989), 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law', Journal of Legal Studies, XVIII (2), June, 325-63
Paul Klemperer (1990), 'How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?', RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1), Spring, 113-30
Gary S. Becker (1968), 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', Journal of Political Economy, 76 (2), March-April, 169-217
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), 'The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVIII (1), March, 45-76
William J. Furlong (1987), 'A General Equilibrium Model of Crime Commission and Prevention', Journal of Public Economics, 34 (1), 87-103
Jennifer F. Reinganum (1988), 'Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion', American Economic Review, 78 (4), September, 713-28.
Barry Nalebluff (1987), 'Credible Pretrial Negotiation', RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (2), Summer, 198-210
Avery Katz (1990), 'The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation', International Review of Law and Economics, 10, 3-27.
Summary
The economic approach to law relies on the use of economic models, mostly mathematical, for understanding the nature and function of law. The articles in this new collection reflect state-of-the-art modeling techniques and explore how to use these to both formulate important questions and resolve particular legal issues. Following an original introduction by the editors, the volume spans the many sub-areas of law and economics (with papers in torts, contracts, property, crime, and legal procedure) and includes a wide range of papers, incorporating classics and some less well-known papers. Economic Models of Law will be an invaluable resource for active scholars as well as an inspiration for the next generation of modelers.
Note
The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings.
Source of Description
Description based on online resource; title from title screen (viewed January 14, 2015).
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Language
English
ISBN
9781784713386 e-book
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