Enterprise law represents the entire range of private contracts and public regulations governing the relationship of different capital providers. Enterprise Law comparatively analyses the way these fundamental legal frameworks complement each other in the United States and Japan. In this collection of essays edited by Professor Zenichi Shishido, a wide range of leading scholars examine the firm as an incentive mechanism and show how law the whole legal system affect the incentive bargain between the firm's major players, positively with markets and social norms. They establish that enterprise law is not always effective in its attempt to affect the incentive bargain of the firm by itself, but instead works by interacting complementarily with markets and social norms. Demonstrating the dynamic relationship between parts and the whole of enterprise law, this exceptional book will be of special interest to comparative law, and law and economics scholars and students.
Formatted Contents Note
pt. I. The incentive bargaining between employees and management pt. II. The incentive bargaining between creditors and management pt. III. The incentive bargaining between shareholders and management pt. IV. The roles of governments.