Wasting a crisis : why securities regulation fails / Paul G.Mahoney.

Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 2015.

1 online resource (xi, 202 pages) : illustrations (black and white)

University Press Scholarship Online.

This study argues that policy responses to financial crises are similar across time and place and are generally ineffective or counterproductive. Political actors, hoping to avoid blame for a financial crisis, create a 'market failure narrative' arguing that misbehaviour by securities market participants, rather than prior policy errors, was the primary cause of the crisis. Regulatory reforms are therefore designed to solve problems that are either non-existent or tangentially related to the crisis. The reforms often decrease competition and concentrate the market share of leading financial firms.

This study argues that policy responses to financial crises are similar across time and place and are generally ineffective or counterproductive. Political actors, hoping to avoid blame for a financial crisis, create a 'market failure narrative' arguing that misbehaviour by securities market participants, rather than prior policy errors, was the primary cause of the crisis. Regulatory reforms are therefore designed to solve problems that are either non-existent or tangentially related to the crisis. The reforms often decrease competition and concentrate the market share of leading financial firms.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

Print version :

English

9780226236650 ebook

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