xiii, 322 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
9781107145238 hardback 1107145236 hardback
Cambridge studies in law and society.
"What explains the success of criminal prosecutions against former Latin American officials accused of human rights violations? Why did some judiciaries evolve from unresponsive bureaucracies into protectors of victim rights? Using a theory of judicial action inspired by sociological institutionalism, this book argues that this was the result of deep transformations in the legal preferences of judges and prosecutors. Judicial actors discarded long-standing positivist legal criteria, historically protective of conservative interests, and embraced doctrines grounded in international human rights law, which made possible innovative readings of constitutions and criminal codes. Litigants were responsible for this shift in legal visions by activating informal mechanisms of ideational change and providing the skills necessary to deal with complex and unusual cases. Through an in-depth exploration of the interactions between judges, prosecutors and human rights lawyers in three countries, the book asks how changing ideas about the law and standards of adjudication condition the exercise of judicial power"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 291-313) and index.
Formatted Contents Note
From unresponsive to responsive judiciaries Legal preferences and strategic litigation : a theory of judicial change Argentina : pedagogical interventions and replacement strategies in the struggle for human rights Peru : pedagogical interventions and human rights trials in unfriendly territory Mexico : an untamed judiciary and the failure of criminal prosecutions Comparative perspectives on the problem of legal preferences.
KG574 .G665 2016
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016.