The federal design dilemma : Congress and intergovernmental delegation / Pamela J. Clouser McCann, University of Southern California.
2016
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Details
Author
Title
The federal design dilemma : Congress and intergovernmental delegation / Pamela J. Clouser McCann, University of Southern California.
Imprint
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Description
1 online resource
Formatted Contents Note
1. The federal design dilemma
a puzzle of intergovernmental delegation
2. A theory of federal delegation design
3. Measuring the federal allocation of authority
4. Intergovernmental context and congressional coalition formation
5. Congressional intergovernmental delegation of authority from 1973-2010
6. Intergovernmental options and the politics of health insurance reform
7. The intergovernmental context of federal policy design.
a puzzle of intergovernmental delegation
2. A theory of federal delegation design
3. Measuring the federal allocation of authority
4. Intergovernmental context and congressional coalition formation
5. Congressional intergovernmental delegation of authority from 1973-2010
6. Intergovernmental options and the politics of health insurance reform
7. The intergovernmental context of federal policy design.
Summary
"The level of government responsible for implementing policies affects intent, services provided, and ultimate outcomes. The decision about where to locate such responsibility is the federal design dilemma faced by Congress. Taking a new approach to this delegation and decentralization, The Federal Design Dilemma focuses on individual members of Congress. Not only are these legislators elected by constituents from their states, they also consider the outcomes that will result from state-level versus national executive branch implementation of policies. Here, Pamela J. Clouser McCann documents congressional intergovernmental delegation between 1973 and 2010, and how individual legislators voted on decentralization and centralization choices. Clouser McCann traces the path of the Affordable Care Act from legislative proposals in each chamber to its final enactment, focusing on how legislators wrestled with their own intergovernmental context and the federal design of health insurance reform in the face of political challenges."--Provided by publisher.
Source of Description
Title from PDF title page (viewed 18 November 2016).
Location
WWW
Available in Other Form
Print version: Clouser McCann, Pamela J. Federal design dilemma. New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016
Access Note
Access restricted to subscribing institutions.
Linked Resources
Language
English
ISBN
9781316275085 (electronic book)
1316275086 (electronic book)
9781316596142 (electronic book)
1316596141 (electronic book)
9781107110465
1107110467
1316275086 (electronic book)
9781316596142 (electronic book)
1316596141 (electronic book)
9781107110465
1107110467
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