Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 309-332) and index.
Formatted Contents Note
Divergent reform experiences Agenda formulation and proposal outcomes Outline of the argument Business power, fiscal bargaining, and redistribution in democracies Research strategy Instrumental power Structural power Integrating analysis of instrumental and structural power Reform strategies: circumventing elites' power Popular mobilization: counteracting (or reinforcing) elites' power Conclusion The rationale for increasing the corporate tax Business's weak structural power Business's strong instrumental power Restricting the agenda: the dynamics of policy proposals under Lagos Continuity and change: corporate tax nonreform under Bachelet The 1990 reform in retrospect Conclusion The concertación's strategy repertoire The 2001 anti-evasion reform Taxing the mining sector Eliminating a regressive income tax benefit Curtailing a regressive VAT credit Conclusion Limited structural power Weak instrumental power Corporate taxes Individual taxes Conclusion Bank-information access and interest earnings Comparative perspective: bank-information access in Chile Taxing financial transactions Conclusion VAT politics Export taxes Conclusion: Argentina's sectoral tax politics Business's instrumental power Popular mobilization Sáchez de Lozada's ill-fated 2003 income tax Mesa's 2004 tax reform The 2005 hydrocarbon reform Conclusion Morales's tax agenda Piñera's tax increases Partisanship and tax policy Business power and influence Business politics and the "public good" Elite cohesion and taxation The politics of policies On politics and explanation.
KG735 .F35 2015
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2015.