Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Martin H. Redish.
2017
KF5130 .R43 2017 (Mapit)
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Author
Title
Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Martin H. Redish.
Imprint
Stanford, California : Stanford Law Books, an imprint of Stanford University Press, [2017]
Description
260 pages ; 24 cm
Formatted Contents Note
Introduction : America's contribution to political thought : prophylactic judicial independence as an instrument of democratic constitutionalism
The foundations of American constitutionalism
A taxonomy of judicial independence
Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism
State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism
Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception
Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism.
The foundations of American constitutionalism
A taxonomy of judicial independence
Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism
State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism
Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception
Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism.
Summary
"The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government. This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. [This book] defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence. [The author] explains how the nation's system of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism cannot survive absent the vesting of final powers of constitutional interpretation and enforcement in the one branch of government expressly protected by the Constitution from direct political accountability: the judicial branch. He uncovers how the current framework of American constitutional law has been unwisely allowed to threaten or undermine these core precepts of judicial independence."-- Back cover.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Location
STA
Available in Other Form
Online version: Redish, Martin H. Judicial independence and the American constitution. Stanford, California : Stanford Law Books, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2017
Call Number
KF5130 .R43 2017
Language
English
ISBN
9780804792905 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
0804792909 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
0804792909 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
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