Statutory default rules : how to interpret unclear legislation / Einer Elhauge.
Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 2008.
vi, 386 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
Formatted Contents Note
Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear The general theory for current preferences default rules Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action Inferring current preferences from agency action From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning Eliciting legislative preferences Canons favoring the politically powerless Linguistic canons of statutory construction Interpretations that may create international conflict Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis Tracking the preferences of political subunits Tracking high court preferences The fit with prior political science models and empirical data Interest groups and collective choice theory Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.