The Federalist papers and institutional power in American political development / Daniel Wirls.
New York, NY : Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
viii, 133 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm.
Formatted Contents Note
The Federalist theory of institutional power The separated institutions sharing power : powers, organization, and constituency in the Federalist Stability, change, and power in the study of political institutions Powers, organization, and constituency in early American political development The second republic : the era of presidential power and the personal branches Conclusion.
This book argues that The Federalist Papers contain a previously unrecognized theory of institutional power centered on the relationships between and among powers (constitutional authority and duties), organization (structure, size, procedures, and internal resources), and constituency (external social support). The distribution of power among the branches is a function of the relative nature of each institution's powers, organization, and constituency. This theory extends and refines the contribution of the papers to political theory and, particularly, to the study of American political development, which rarely draws upon The Federalist Papers in more than a pro forma fashion. Wirls explicates this model of institutional power and shows how it brings greater coherence to the papers. He relates the Federalist perspective to contemporary institutional analysis and then applies the theory to two periods in American political history. -- Back cover.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 120-128) and index.