Introduction
Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character
Some remarks on methodology
Some semantics of "consciousness"
Preamble
Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive
State consciousness
Unconscious mental states
Self-consciousness
Phenomenal consciousness
A formula for state consciousness
Nagel's what-it-is-like formula
Putative counterexamples
Non-conscious phenomenality?
Summary
Consciousness and self-awareness
Preamble
A gloss on intentionality
The transitivity principle
Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle
Higher-orderism
Preamble
The higher-order theory of consciousness
A "one-state" alternative
Preamble
The Brentanian model
Objections and replies
Representationalism
Preamble
The representational theory of phenomenal character
The nature of phenomenal character
Preamble
Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness
Some brief remarks on privacy
Conclusion.