Lawyer barons : what their contingency fees really cost America / Lester Brickman.
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.
xxv, 556 pages ; 24 cm
Formatted Contents Note
The origin of the contingency fee How profitable are contingency fees? Are contingency fee profits "reasonable"? How tort lawyers have increased their profits by restraining competition Why the market has failed to correct the absence of price competition Impediments imposed by the bar to price competition The effects of incentives created by contingency fees How the quest for profits influenced the development of the tort system Lawyers' role in the expansion of tort liability The role of the judiciary in tort system expansion Current and future expansions of tort liability The "litigation explosion" : fact or fiction? Measures of the rate of expansion of tort liability The relationship between injury rates and tort system costs The impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates Class actions Fees in class actions How class action lawyers game fee setting Securities class actions Regulation through litigation A new role for punitive damages : policy making as a profit center For-profit partnerships between state attorneys general and contingency fee lawyers.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
KF310.C6 B75 2011
9781107001220 hardback alkaline paper 1107001226 hardback alkaline paper 9780521189491 paperback alkaline paper 0521189497 paperback alkaline paper