Macondo : the Gulf oil disaster : Chief Counsel's report / National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.

Foreword
Executive summary of findings
Technical findings
Management findings
Regulatory findings
Chapter 1: Scope Of Investigation And Methodology
Nature of report
Scope of investigation and report
Investigation methodology
Structure of the report
Chapter 2: Drilling For Oil In Deepwater
Oil and gas in deepwater
How to drill a deepwater well
Chapter 3: Background On The Macondo Well, The Deepwater Horizon, And The Companies Involved
Macondo well
Deepwater Horizon
Companies and individuals involved in the Macondo Blowout


Chapter 4: Technical Findings
Underlying technical causes
Underlying management causes
Chapter 4-1: Flow Path
Potential flow paths
Forensic evidence suggests that hydrocarbons did not flow up the annulus and through the seal assembly
Hydrocarbons appear to have flowed into and up the production casing
Technical findings
Chapter 4-2: Well Design
Deepwater well design
Macondo well design
Drilling the Macondo well
Technical findings
Management findings
Chapter 4-3: Cement
Well cementing
Preparing for the Macondo cement job
Designing the Macondo cement job
Planning for and installing centralizers at Macondo
Float collar installation and conversion at Macondo
Pre-cementing wellbore conditioning at Macondo
Cementing process at Macondo
Float check at Macondo
Cement evaluation at Macondo
Technical findings
Management findings
Chapter 4-4: Foamed Cement Stability
Foamed cement
Foamed cement at Macondo
Technical findings
Management findings
Chapter 4-5: Temporary Abandonment
Temporary abandonment
Temporary abandonment at Macondo
Technical findings
Management findings
Chapter 4-6: Negative Pressure Test
Well integrity tests
Negative pressure test at Macondo
Technical findings
Management findings
Chapter 4-7: Kick Detection
Well monitoring and kick detection
Well monitoring at Macondo
Technical findings
Management findings
Chapter 4-8: Kick Response
Well control equipment
Kick response at Macondo
Technical findings
Management findings
Chapter 4-9: Blowout Preventer
Blind shear rams
Blind shear ram activation at Macondo
ROV hot stab activation at Macondo
Automatic blind shear ram activation at Macondo
Potential reasons the blind shear ram failed to seal
BOP recertification
Technical findings
Management findings
Chapter 4-10: Maintenance
Transocean's rig management system
Competing interests between drilling and maintenance
Lack of onshore maintenance
Maintenance audits and inspections
Maintenance findings
Chapter 5: Overarching Failures Of Management
Leadership
Communication
Procedures
Employees
Contractors
Technology
Risk
Closing
Chapter 6: Regulatory Observations
MMS background
MMS regulations did not address many key risk factors for the blowout
BOP recertification
Ethical considerations
Endnotes
Appendix A: Blowout investigation team
Appendix B: Commission staff
Appendix C: Acronyms
Appendix D: Chevron laboratory report cover letter
Appendix E: Nile and Kaskida
Schedule when the Deepwater Horizon arrived at Macondo request to suspend operations at Kaskida.