Discussions of race in American law and politics have been captured by the figure of the colour-blind Constitution. Whether embraced as an ideal of constitutional equality or rejected for perpetuating historical injustice, advocates and critics alike view colour-blindness as a refusal of racial consciousness rather than its mobilization. And yet, enacting a colour-blind rule may be understood in itself to affect a heightened awareness of race. Accordingly, colour-blind constitutionalism represents a particular form of racial consciousness rather than an alternative to it. Challenging familiar understandings of race, rights, and the US Constitution, this work explores how current equal protection law renders the pursuit of racial equality constitutionally suspect.-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Formatted Contents Note
Part I. The race-conscious logic of color-blind constitutionalism Beyond color-blindness and color-consciousness Constitutional racism, redemptive constitutionalism Part II. Color-blindness against the color line The lessons of Plessy The limits of Brown Part III. Color-blindness after the color line Defending white rights Is race equality unconstitutional?
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Digital File Characteristics
Source of Description
Ttle from digital title page (viewed on April 04, 2018).
Available in Other Form
Print version: Golub, Mark. Is racial equality unconstitutional? New York, NY : Oxford University Press,