Coercive sanctions and international conflicts : a sociological theory / Mark Daniel Jaeger.
2018
KZ6373 .J34 2018 (Mapit)
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Author
Title
Coercive sanctions and international conflicts : a sociological theory / Mark Daniel Jaeger.
Imprint
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018.
Copyright
©2018
Description
xvi, 254 pages ; 25 cm.
Series
New international relations.
Formatted Contents Note
Sanctions : disconnected theorizing of a relational phenomenon
A sociological theory of coercive international sanctions
Methodology & methods
Sticks, carrots, and conflict transformation : China's sanctions against Taiwan
Escalating and de-escalating conflict : sanctions on Iran's nuclear program
Evolving sanctions strategies, changing conflict observations.
A sociological theory of coercive international sanctions
Methodology & methods
Sticks, carrots, and conflict transformation : China's sanctions against Taiwan
Escalating and de-escalating conflict : sanctions on Iran's nuclear program
Evolving sanctions strategies, changing conflict observations.
Summary
Perhaps the most common question raised in the literature on coercive international sanctions is: "Do sanctions work?" Unsurprisingly, the answer to such a sweeping question remains inconclusive. However, even the widely-presumed logic of coercive sanctions - that economic impact translates into effective political pressure - is not the primary driver of conflict developments. Furthermore, existing rationalist-economistic approaches neglect one of the most striking differences seen across sanctions conflicts: the occurrence of positive sanctions or their combination with negative sanctions, implicitly taking them as logically indifferent. Instead of asking whether sanctions work, this book addresses a more basic question: How do coercive international sanctions work, and more substantially, what are the social conditions within sanctions conflicts that are conducive to either cooperation or non-cooperation? Arguing that coercive sanctions and international conflicts are relational, socially-constructed facts, the author explores the (de-)escalation of sanctions conflicts from a sociological perspective. Whether sanctions are conducive to either cooperation or non-cooperation depends on the one hand on the meaning they acquire for opponents as inducing decisions upon mutual conflict. On the other hand, negative sanctions, positive sanctions, or their combination each contribute differently to the way in which opponents perceive conflict, and to its potential transformation. Thus, it is premature to 'predict' the political effectiveness of sanctions simply based on economic impact. -- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Call Number
KZ6373 .J34 2018
Language
English
ISBN
9781138697171 hardcover
1138697176 hardcover
9781315522432 electronic book
1315522438 electronic book
9781315522432 electronic book
1138697176 hardcover
9781315522432 electronic book
1315522438 electronic book
9781315522432 electronic book
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