This insightful research review provides analysis of the most important contemporary work by experts in the economic analysis of legal reasoning and interpretation. It explores a wide range of topics in the field, from constitutional to statutory interpretation, precedent and the interpretation of contracts. The articles discussed raise key questions concerning the optimal construction of institutions, the best approach to judicial decision-making, and the best strategies for statutory and contract drafting. This fascinating review will be valuable to academics interested in legal reasoning, economic analysis and legal philosophy.
Includes index. The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings.
Formatted Contents Note
Recommended readings (Machine generated): 1. A.C. Pritchard and Todd J. Zywicki (1999), 'Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation', North Carolina Law Review, 77 (2), January, 409-521 2. John O. McGinnis (2014), 'Public Choice Originalism: Bork, Buchanan and the Escape from the Progressive Paradigm', Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, 10 (3), Fall, 669-88 3. Jonathan R. Macey (1986), 'Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model', Columbia Law Review, 86 (2), March, 223-68 4. John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast (1992), 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (2), June, 263-79 5. Robert D. Cooter and Tom Ginsburg (1996), 'Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models', International Review of Law and Economics, 16 (3), September, 295-313 6. Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins (2005), 'Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent', Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 14 (2), February, 585-617 7. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1976), 'Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis', Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2), August, 249-307 8. Erin O'Hara (1993), 'Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis', Seton Hall Law Review, 24 (2), June, 736-78 9. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2006), 'Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis', International Review of Law and Economics, 26 (4), December, 519-35 10. Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer (2007), 'Overruling and the Instability of Law', Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (2), June, 309-28 11. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner (1989), 'Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules', Yale Law Journal, 99 (1), October, 87-130 12. Alan Schwartz (1992), 'Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies', Journal of Legal Studies, 21 (2), June, 271-318 13. Gillian K. Hadfield (1994), 'Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts', Journal of Legal Studies, 23 (1), January, 159-84 14. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott (2003), 'Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law', Yale Law Journal, 113 (3), December, 541-619 15. Avery Wiener Katz (2004), 'The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation', Columbia Law Review, 104 (2), March, 496-538 16. Richard A. Posner (2005), 'The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation', Texas Law Review, 83 (6), May, 1581-614 17. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott (2010), 'Contract Interpretation Redux', Yale Law Journal, 119 (5), March, 926-64 18. Steven J. Burton (2013), 'A Lesson on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract Interpretation', Indiana Law Journal, 88 (1), Winter, 339-60