Legal Conventionalism / edited by Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña, Josep M. Vilajosana.
2019
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Title
Legal Conventionalism / edited by Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña, Josep M. Vilajosana.
Added Corporate Author
Edition
1st ed. 2019.
Imprint
Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019.
Description
VI, 198 p. online resource.
Series
Law and philosophy library. 2215-0315 ; 126.
Formatted Contents Note
Part 1 The Notion of Convention
Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background
Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency
Part II Conventions and The Rule of Recognition
Conventions, Reasons, and the Law
The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention
Social Facts and Law: Why is the Rule of Recognition a Convention?
Cooperative Conventions, Rule of Recognition and Institutional Practices
On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach
Part III Conventions and Legal Interpretation
Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin's Criticisms
Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference
The Interpretation of Plans.
Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background
Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency
Part II Conventions and The Rule of Recognition
Conventions, Reasons, and the Law
The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention
Social Facts and Law: Why is the Rule of Recognition a Convention?
Cooperative Conventions, Rule of Recognition and Institutional Practices
On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach
Part III Conventions and Legal Interpretation
Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin's Criticisms
Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference
The Interpretation of Plans.
Summary
The concept of convention has been used in different fields and from different perspectives to account for important social phenomena, and the legal sphere is no exception. Rather, reflection on whether the legal phenomenon is based on a convention and, if so, what kind of convention is involved, has become a recurring issue in contemporary legal theory. In this book, some of the foremost specialists in the field make significant contributions to this debate. In the first part, the concept of convention is analysed. The second part reflects on whether the rule of recognition postulated by Hart can be understood as a convention and discusses its potential and limitations in order to explain the institutional and normative character of law. Lastly, the third part critically examines the relations between conventionalism and legal interpretation. Given the content and quality of the contributions, the book is of interest to those wanting to understand the current state of the art in legal conventionalism as well as those wanting to deepen their knowledge about these questions.
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SpringerLink electronic monographs.
Language
English
ISBN
9783030035716
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