The political economy of the investment treaty regime / Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Michael Waibel.
2017
K3830 .B66 2017 (Mapit)
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Title
The political economy of the investment treaty regime / Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Michael Waibel.
Edition
First edition.
Imprint
New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2017.
Description
xxviii, 325 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Formatted Contents Note
The investment treaty regime in context
Foreign investment : economic and legal foundations
Investment treaty arbitration
Standards of investment protection
The microeconomics of investment treaties
Investment treaties, foreign investment, and development
Politics of investment treaties in developed countries
Politics of investment treaties in developing countries
Legitimacy and governance challenges.
Foreign investment : economic and legal foundations
Investment treaty arbitration
Standards of investment protection
The microeconomics of investment treaties
Investment treaties, foreign investment, and development
Politics of investment treaties in developed countries
Politics of investment treaties in developing countries
Legitimacy and governance challenges.
Summary
Investment treaties are some of the most controversial but least understood instruments of global economic governance. Public interest in international investment arbitration is growing and some developed and developing countries are beginning to revisit their investment treaty policies. 'The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime' synthesises and advances the growing literature on this subject by integrating legal, economic, and political perspectives. Based on an analysis of the substantive and procedural rights conferred by investment treaties, it asks four basic questions. What are the costs and benefits of investment treaties for investors, states, and other stakeholders? Why did developed and developing countries sign the treaties? Why should private arbitrators be allowed to review public regulations passed by states? And what is the relationship between the investment treaty regime and the broader regime complex that governs international investment? 0Through a concise, but comprehensive, analysis, this book fills in some of the many "blind spots" of academics from different disciplines, and is the first port of call for lawyers, investors, policy-makers, and stakeholders trying to make sense of these critical instruments governing investor-state relations.
Note
Investment treaties are some of the most controversial but least understood instruments of global economic governance. Public interest in international investment arbitration is growing and some developed and developing countries are beginning to revisit their investment treaty policies. 'The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime' synthesises and advances the growing literature on this subject by integrating legal, economic, and political perspectives. Based on an analysis of the substantive and procedural rights conferred by investment treaties, it asks four basic questions. What are the costs and benefits of investment treaties for investors, states, and other stakeholders? Why did developed and developing countries sign the treaties? Why should private arbitrators be allowed to review public regulations passed by states? And what is the relationship between the investment treaty regime and the broader regime complex that governs international investment? 0Through a concise, but comprehensive, analysis, this book fills in some of the many "blind spots" of academics from different disciplines, and is the first port of call for lawyers, investors, policy-makers, and stakeholders trying to make sense of these critical instruments governing investor-state relations.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 261-314) and index.
Location
STA
Call Number
K3830 .B66 2017
Language
English
ISBN
9780198719540 (hardback)
9780198719557 (paperback)
019871954X
0198719558
9780198719557 (paperback)
019871954X
0198719558
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